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Managing the Rule of Law in the Americas:
An Empirical Portrait of the Effects of 15
Years of WTO, MERCOSUL, and NAFTA
Dispute Resolution on Civil Society
in Latin America
Stephen Joseph Powell and
Ludmila Mendon~a Lopes Ribeiro*
I.

ABSTRACT

The objective of this article is to analyze the extent to which
World Trade Organization (WTO), Common Market of the South
(MERCOSUL), and North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) disputes involving Latin American (LA) countries have
assisted LA governments in perfecting the rule of law. Specifically, we examine the extent to which dispute settlement facilitates the strengthening by LA governments to improve human
rights and enhance civil society. Professor Powell previously has
noted that trade and human rights are inextricably linked
because trade rules weaken the ability of governments to promote
sustainable development, to alleviate the widening gap between
rich and poor, to ensure core labor rights among their workforce,
to deter trafficking in women and farm workers, to address devastating levels of disease, to preserve indigenous and other cultural
identities, and even helps to sustain democratic governance.
* Professor Powell is Senior Lecturer in Law and Director of the International
Trade Law Program at the University of Florida's Fredric G. Levin College of Law.
From 1982 to 1999, Powell was Chief Counsel for Import Administration in the US
Department of Commerce. In 2009 Dr. Ribeiro was awarded a Ph.D. in social science,
specializing in international criminology, by Instituto Universitdrio de Pesquisas do
Rio de Janeiro. This article unites Dr. Ribeiro's sociology studies with her earlier
legal education that culminated in award of the LL.B. degree in 2002 by Universidade
Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, which also awarded Dr.
Ribeiro a Masters degree in Public Administration in 2003. Dr. Ribeiro conducts
research now at Fundado Getillio Vargas in Sdo Paulo. The authors extend their
deep appreciation to their industrious research assistants, Tea Sisic, Alexandra
Hunter Slavens, and Justin Bleak of the UF Law Class of 2010, and Jacqueline
Kweka of the UF Law LL.M. in International and Comparative Law Class of 2008.
1. Stephen J. Powell & Paola A. Chavarro, Toward a Vibrant Peruvian Middle
Class: Effects of the Peru-United States Free Trade Agreement on Labor Rights,
Biodiversity, and Indigenous Populations, 20 FLA. J. INT'L L. 93, 94 (2008). Powell
and Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol have argued, however, that a state of conflict
between trade and human rights is not foreordained and that the synchronicity of
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Our study permitted the creation of an extensive series of
data arrays on dozens of aspects of dispute panel decisions, ranging from the countries most actively appearing before panels, the
measures most often challenged, the effectiveness of dispute settlement systems to reach their treaty timelines, and the trend
toward increased litigation before regional trade panels rather
than the WTO. We documented the increased frequency in the
rate of appeal if the USA was a party measured by the extent to
which dispute resolution has brought non-conforming laws into
compliance, and revealed prevailing undercurrents in
MERCOSUL from the pattern of dispute settlement among the
Members.
The article finds that a groundswell of legislation has
increased the transparency and accountability of government rule
making, which lends support to our hypothesis that trade dispute
settlement contributes to the management and perfection of the
rule of law in support of democratic governance for civil societies
in Latin America. Although governments must enforce these laws
with vigor in order for civil society to flourish in the realms of freedom of expression and due process, we are heartened by the
results of this project. Particularly, the legislative data correlates
positively with the proposition additional laws are improving
upon the enforcement apparatus and infrastructure already in
place within those respective governments.
II.

PREVIOUS STUDIES ON TRADE AND

HUMAN RIGHTS

The International Trade Law Program at the University of
Florida has explored in some depth the general impact of trade
rules on human rights. Our premise is straightforward. Trade
and human rights are inextricably linked because trade rules
weaken the ability of governments to promote sustainable development, to alleviate the widening gap between rich and poor, to
ensure core labor rights within the workforce, deter trafficking in
women and farm workers, address devastating levels of disease,
preserve indigenous and other cultural identities, and even sustain democratic governance.2 The article warned that purposeful
their common foundations and goals can be splendidly integrated "to promote the
social well-being of the individual alongside the economic well-being of the world."
BERTA ESPERANZA HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN J. POWELL, JUST TRADE: A NEW
COVENANT LINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 297 (2009).
2. Powell & Chavarro, supra note 1. See also Berta E. Hernndez-Truyol, The
FLA. J. INT'L L. 167, 192 (2004).

Rule of Law and Human Rights, 16
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coordination of these two critical public policies is "ignored only at
the peril both of trade and human rights agendas," we argued that
"trade negotiators must ever be mindful that global trade rules do
not operate in a vacuum, but instead cohabit a world of preexisting human rights laws- articulated most often by demands of the
labor and environment sectors, but underpinned by even more
basic human rights of individuals such as the right to education
and freedom from oppression - that simply should not, in any sensible system of laws, be contravened by narrow economic
precepts."3
The study first examines the global rules, identifying the surprisingly numerous direct linkages between trade and human
rights in World Trade Organization agreements. 4 While concluding that international trade rules have done little with their commanding strength to avoid conflict-much less promote conscious
integration-with human rights law, we identified an arsenal of
WTO provisions that stand ready for use as instruments of this
necessary task. The general exceptions of the GATT's Public
Health and Welfare Clause contain numerous examples of potential shelter from the foundational non-discrimination premises of
global trade rules. From the protection of public morals to measures aimed directly at ensuring public health to guarantees of a
healthy environment, GATT Article XX, as interpreted broadly by
the WTO's new world trade court, has set a hopeful path toward
elevating human rights policies above economic ones. The world
trade court's enthusiastic embrace of public international law to
aid in its interpretation of WTO provisions adds to this optimism
because it brings into play other customary and treaty sources of
human rights law.'
From the global trade rules and the more visible and controversial linkages between international trade law and international human rights law, we turned to regional economic
arrangements within the Americas to uncover more indirect or
hidden linkages between trade and human rights. Our focus centers upon the contribution of regional free trade agreements
(FTAs)-primarily the rich trove of such pacts found among the
nations of the Western Hemisphere-to the rule of law. The rule of
3. Stephen J. Powell, Regional Economic Arrangements and the Rule of Law in
the Americas: The Human Rights Faceof Trade Agreements, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 59, 612 (2005).
4. Powell & Chavarro, supra note 1, at 95.
5. Stephen J. Powell, The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade
OrganizationRules, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 219, 224 (2004).
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law, the definition of which in our usage includes the substantive
ingredients of justice and fairness, is basic to the enjoyment of
human rights.6 We hypothesized that FTAs, by their necessary
ground rules and quite without meaning to do so, have pronounced effects on attainment of rules-based governance.
We found strong anecdotal evidence that FTAs indeed contribute to enjoyment by civil society in general, and not solely by
those involved in international trade, of rules-based governance.
Regional trade agreements require governments to conduct their
activities in a more transparent and expeditious manner, relying
exclusively on administrative records created with input from all
affected members of civil society. These agreements mandate that
government measures be subject to substantive review by an independent and accessible judiciary. They require transparency,
accountability, and due process by governments. Dispute settlement systems in FTAs similarly promote timeliness, inclusive
record keeping, and impartiality in the administrative decisional
process.7
That further work remained was clear from our finding that
"the rule of law" remains an inaccessible objective unless defined
within the context of specific cultural premises and combined with
the substantive norms that frame the concept for use in a particular society. Moreover, FTAs cannot directly inject rules-based
governance into a country. Only national governments can ensure
the success of the rule of law for their citizens. Outside sources
such as international treaties can only lend a "helping hand" to
governments in their transformation of these FTAs into legislation, regulations, policy guidance, and administrative measures
that will contribute to previously established national objectives
to promote rules-based governance.'
We next tested our theses within the context of a particular
culture and a single trade agreement. The paper examining Peru
and its Trade Promotion Agreement with the United States suggested several "small steps" that the Peruvian and US governments could take within the context of their FTA to improve
worker rights, protection of the environment, and preservation of
6. Application of the rule of law is included, along with open and transparent
civil institutions, in the list of the trappings of democracy, which was affirmed as a
human right by the United Nations in 1999, C.H.Rule res. 1999/57/ U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1999/57 (1999). See DAVID WEISSBRODT, JOAN FITZPATRICK, & FRANK NEWMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 540 (3d ed. 2001).
7. Powell, supra note 3, at 97.

8. Powell, supra note 3, at 70.
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indigenous cultures.'
III.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PRESENT STUDY:
THE IDEA OF RULE OF LAW

The idea of the rule of law includes the substantive ingredients of justice and fairness. It also includes open and transparent
institutions. 10 Viewed from that perspective, the rule of law bears
a strong relationship to the ideas of transparency, accountability,
and due process by governments that implement these trade
agreements.
Moreover, the rule of law is basic to enjoyment of human
rights in general. 1' Therefore, the authors hypothesized that international trade agreements, by their necessary ground rules and
quite without meaning to do so, assist state parties in promoting
timeliness, inclusive record keeping, and impartiality in the
administrative decisional process. The purpose of this study is to
interrogate whether international trade dispute settlement
assists in converting the visions of law as an operative system and
justice as a moral construct into an integrated reality.
All international trade agreements contain provisions that
incidentally aid member governments committed to strengthening
the rule of law for their citizens." In particular, dispute settlement system attributes of timeliness, impartiality, and record
keeping not only determine the procedures to be followed by dispute resolution entities, but also serve as powerful supplements to
measures governments already have in place to advance the rule
of law. In the present study, we test this thesis by measuring the
degree to which agreements actually are achieving these effects.
This first part the study, before turning to the effects on
national laws, asks whether trade dispute settlement is managing
its own legal regime effectively, that is, are governments administering the dispute systems and are dispute panels hearing the
challenges, producing outcomes in accordance with their own obligations to issue decisions within the time frames set by the trade
agreement? To that end, we gathered data from the records that
each secretariat has kept and constructed a data panel related to
9. Powell & Chavarro, supra note 1, at 139.
10. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 214,
217 (1979).
11. Powell & Chavarro, supra note 1, at 95.
12. See Powell, supra note 3, at 96-97.
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this aspect of management of the rule of law by dispute settlement
systems.
IV.
A.

THE

WTO

AS A MECHANISM OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Background

To understand how the rule of law is applied in the context of
the WTO dispute resolution system, it is important first to comprehend the foundations of this trade agreement. The WTO is the
culmination of a series of multilateral negotiations that took place
during a half century of explosive trade growth, accompanied
inevitably by increasingly strident trade conflicts." In a historical
perspective, we can trace its ancestry to 1947, when the international trading system began as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), which set down the fundamental nondiscrimination rules that continue to this day to govern global trade. 14
On January 1, 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
came into force to administer the two dozen agreements that comprise the WTO/GATT system, one that requires the present 150+
Members to adhere to each agreement without exception. 5 This
unitary structure, which replaced GATT's a la carte approach,
made the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) an
even more powerful umpire of trade conflict, given the broad reach
of dispute settlement and its near-binding nature.16 The DSU provided for the creation of the Dispute Settlement Body to oversee
the system, ad hoc panels of trade experts to make initial decisions on challenges to government trade measures, and the inelegantly branded "Appellate Body," (AB) which serves as the World
Trade Court. 7
Any dispute that originates from a complaint by a Member
country that another Member has created a trade policy or taken
an action that violates a WTO agreement may be brought before a
dispute settlement panel created under rules of the DSU. Once a
member country presents a request for consultations (complain13. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 235

(5th ed. 2008).
14. Grant E. Isaac & William A. Kerr, Genetically Modified Organisms and Trade
Rules: Identifying Important Challenges to WTO, 26 World Econ. 29, 30 (2003).
15. Supra note 15, at 240.
16. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakeesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2,, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401[hereinafter DSU].
17. See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 1, at 39-40.
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ant) in order to determine whether another country is violating a
WTO rule protected by a WTO agreement (respondent), the dispute settlement system of the WTO becomes operative. 8
The Dispute Settlement Body is composed of representatives
of all WTO Member countries. It is essentially a "General Council" of ambassadors of the Members countries. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has the sole authority to establish "panels" of
experts to consider the case, and to accept or reject the panels'
findings or the results of an appeal. It monitors the implementation of the rulings and recommendations and has the power to
authorize retaliation when a country does not comply with a
ruling.
When a case requires further dispute resolution beyond consultations, the DSB establishes a panel. Panels consist of three
(possibly five) experts from different countries who examine the
evidence and produce a report with its opinion. The panel's report
is passed to the DSB, which can only reject the report by consensus. Panelists for each case can be chosen from a permanent list
of well-qualified candidates, or from elsewhere. They serve in
their individual capacities. They cannot receive instructions from
any government.
If a country disagrees with the legal reasoning of the panel
decision, it may appeal the decision as of right. Three members of
a permanent seven-member Appellate Body set up by the DSB
and broadly representing the range of WTO membership hear
each appeal. Members of the Appellate Body have four-year terms,
are selected by the Members based on their recognized standing in
the field of law and international trade, and may not be affiliated
with any government. The appeal can-uphold, modify, or reverse
the panel's legal findings and conclusions. Normally appeals
should not last more than 60 days, with an absolute maximum of
90 days. The DSB has to accept or reject the appeals report within
30 days; rejection is only possible by consensus.
The route that the case can follow from the time that one
country presents a demand to WTO until WTO presents to the
country the final solution, can be summarized by Figure IV-01.

18. See DSU, supra note 16 , art. 4.3.

204

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:2

IV-01

- DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY ARTICLES FOR
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE - ALL THE ROUTES THAT
THE CASE CAN FOLLOW WITH THE LEGAL DISPOSITION AND

FIGURE

THE TIME PRESCRIBE FOR EACH PHASE

t

Consultations
(Art. 4)

60 days

During all stages
good offices, conciliation,
or mediation (Art. 15)

Panel established
by Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) (Art. 6)

by 2nd DSB
meeting

Terms of reference (Art. 7)
Composition (Art. 8)

0-20 days

NOTE: a panel
can be
'composed'

t

20 days (+10 if
Director-General
asked to pick panel)

(i.e. panelists
Expert review group chosen) up to
about 30 days
(Art. 13; Appendix 4)
its
afer
'establishment'
(i.e. after
DSBs decision
to have a panel
Review meeting
with panel
upon request
(Art. 15.2)

Panel examination
Normally 2 meetins with parties (Art. 12),
1 meeting with third parties (Art. 10)

t

Interim review stage
Descriptive part of report
sent to parties for comment (Art. 15.1)
Interim report sent to parties for comment
(Art. 15.2)
6 months from panel's
composition,
3 months if urgent

t

up to 9 months
from panel's
establishment

60 days for panel
report unless
applealed..

'REASONABLE
PERIOD OF
TIME':
determined by:
member
proposes, DSB
agrees; or parties
in dispute agree;
or arbitrator
(approx 15
months if by
arbitrator)

30 days after
'reasonable
period' expries

.. 30 days for
appellate report

Panel report issued to parties
(Art. 12.8; Appendix 3 par 12(j))
Panel report issued to DSB
(Art. 12.9; Appendix 3 par 12(k))

DSB adopts panel/appellate report(s)

Appellate review
(Art. 16.4 and 17)

/

including and changes to panel report made
by appellate report (Art. 16.1,16.4 and 17.14)

Implementation
report by losing party proposed
implementation within 'reasonable period of
time' (Art. 21.3)
In cases of non.implementation
parties negotiate compensation pendinding
full implementation (Art. 22.2)

Dispute over
implementation:
Proceedings possible,
including referrral to
intitial panel on
implementation
(Art. 21.5)

max 90days
TOTAL FOR
REPORT
ADOPTION:
Usually up to 9
months (no
appeal), or 12
months (sith
appeal) from
establishment
of panel to
adoption of
report (Art .20)

90 days

t

Retaliation
If no agreement on compensation, DSB
authorizes tetaliation pending full
implementation (Art. 22)
Cross-retaliation:
same sector, other sectors, other agreements
(Art. 22.3)

Source: WTO we b

site

Possibility of
arbitration
on level of suspension
procedures and
principles of
retaliation
(Art. 22.6 and 22.7)

W-

19

19. Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, The Panel Process, WORLD TRADE
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif e/disp2_e.htm (last
visited Apr. 7, 2011).
ORGANIZATION,
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Thus, in order to evaluate a) how many cases involving Latin
America's countries had been submitted to WTO dispute settlement since it was created; b) what type of dispute resolution each
case has demanded; c) how much time each case has taken to
reach a decision; and d) how other trade agreements are changing
the number of cases submitted to WTO, the Levin College of Law
at the University of Florida developed a project to gather the data
about these cases. We summarize the results of this in the following section.
B.

The data collection and the results

In pursuit of our objective, we gathered data about disputes
from 1995 to 2007. Using this information and relevant provisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU),2 ° we
analyzed various aspects of these disputes. Among other things,
we looked at the efficiency of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) in meeting treaty-set deadlines, the types of measures challenged, and the nature of the final resolution of the dispute.
In the 12 years included in our study, the DSB has received
74 requests for consultations involving two LA countries or one LA
country and the United States of America (USA). The results illustrate that although cases between LA countries and the USA are
very common (24 cases in a total of 74), most of the cases are
between two LA countries (50 cases in a total of 74). Most of the
cases challenge taxes and regular tariffs as well as safeguard
measures.
These cases are usually settled by panel decision, although a
high number of cases were resolved through a "solution mutually
acceptable to the parties "21 prior to establishment of a panel. This
result is positive for the disputing parties because an agreement
can be found in a short length of time. The length of time for issuance of a panel decision is not only longer, but the data show that
panels routinely take even longer than the DSU anticipates.
Few experts have devoted their attention to empirical analyses describing these disputes, and there are almost no empirical
studies that have attempted to measure how much time the DSB
takes to process a case at the panel and Appellate Body levels in
comparison to the timeline prescribed by the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) that generally contains the procedural
20. See DSU, supra note 16.
21. DSU, supra note 16, art. 3.7 ("A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to
a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.").
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rules for WTO disputes. 22 Therefore, in order better to understand
the details and timelines of these cases, the Levin College of Law
at the University of Florida has gathered information and has
drawn several conclusions based on this research.
TABLE

IV-O1

-

COMPLAINANTS AND RESPONDENTS IN

DISPUTES BETWEEN

2

OR MORE

OR MORE

LA

LA

WTO

MEMBERS OR BETWEEN

MEMBERS AND

1

USA

Comlainant
Respondent

Tt

STotal
0

Argentina
0
2 1
Brazil
1
0 0
Chile
5
0 0
Colombia
0
0 0
Dominican
Republic
0
0 0
Ecuador
0
0 1
0
0 00
Guatemala
Mexico
0
1 1
Nicaragua
0
0 0
Panama
0
0 0
Peru
1
1 2
Uruguay
1
0 0
USA
3
9 11
Venezuela
0
000
Total
11
13 6
Source: WTO database, organized

0
0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0

c

W

0
0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0
2

1
0
0
2
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
1 0
0
10
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0 2
0
0 1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0 0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0 0
00
1
2
1
0
6 0
0
0
0 0
0
0 0
3
2
2
4
3
7 1
2
by College of Law - University of Florida

ci)

4
5
1
0

7
6
8
2

0
0
1
6
0
1
0

3
2
1
11
2
1
4
1
0 24
2 2
2074

Thus, analyzing Table IV-01 we can assert that from the total of
cases involving at least one Latin American country submitted to
the DSB (74)23, 30 cases were between two Latin American countries (complainant and respondent) and 44 cases were between the
USA and a Latin American country. It is interesting to observe
also that the USA is a party in more of these cases than any single
22. Other WTO Agreements sometimes prescribe special rules for disputes
involving these Agreements but none overrides the time frame for processing disputes
anticipated by the DSU. . E.g., Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 17.6, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S 221
[hereinafter Antidumping Agreement].
23. Hundreds of other disputes not involving at least one LA country were filed
with the WTO in this period. We are analyzing only the cases where an LA country
was a complainant or a respondent.
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Latin American country. For a breakdown of these cases organized by year, see Table IV-02.
TABLE IV-02 - NUMBER OF WTO CASES INVOLVING
MEMBERS OR ONE LA MEMBER AND THE USA

LA

ORGANIZED BY YEAR DISPUTE INITIATED
Number of cases between
Number of cases between
two LA countries
USA and LA country
Year
4
1995
0
0
4
1996
1
6
1997
1
1998
0
3
1999
0
2000
6
7
3
2001
7
5
2002
4
4
5
2003
0
1
2004
3
2005
2
2
2006
4
1
1
2007
44
Total
30
Source: WTO database, organized by College of Law - University of Florida

Total
4
4
7
1
3
13
10
9
9
1
5
6
2
74

Analyzing Table IV-02, we can identify the following details: a)
the number of cases involving the USA and an LA country is
higher than the number of cases involving two LA countries; b)
the number of such cases submitted to the DSB has increased in
the period between 1995 and 2001 and has decreased in the period
between 2002 and 2007; c) the relationship between the number of
cases submitted to the DSB and the year (an increase followed by
a decrease in case filings) is the same for cases involving only LA
countries and cases involving USA and LA countries.
One explanation for the decrease in the number of cases submitted to WTO dispute settlement in the later years could be the
fact that those countries are more often submitting their disputes
to regional trade agreements as they become more confident in the
credibility of those systems. We could not verify this hypothesis
because of the dissimilarity of the dispute settlement systems
involved. Our personal experience with these systems convinces
us that the hypothesis is valid for MERCOSUL, but not for
NAFTA countries.
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We may hypothesize that one reason for this inward turn
toward greater reliance on MERCOSUL dispute settlement is that
its Members have been less willing over time to share their "internal" conflicts with the broader trade community. 24 For reasons discussed below, the NAFTA does not aspire to any role other than
economic integration of the Parties. There is no hesitation
whatever for the NAFTA Parties to "air their dirty laundry" in the
global forum. Another reason is that the dispute settlement system under MERCOSUL has been slower to develop than in the
NAFTA, which entered into force with a fully operation system in
1994.25 MERCOSUL was established in 1991 with no dispute resolution system, which was added by the Protocol of Olivos in 1998.
The 2006 Protocol of Ouro Preto added a private right of action for
complaints to be brought by members of civil society, although
establishment of a dispute settlement panel continues to require
state-party approval. 6 Thus, it could be said that only in the past
few years has MERCOSUL dispute settlement stood as an acceptable alternative to the sophisticated system created in the WTO.
From Table IV-03, we can see that in 27 percent of the cases
the USA was a complainant against a LA country. On the other
hand, in 40.54 percent of the cases, the USA was respondent in a
case brought by a LA country. Therefore, although the number of
cases in which the USA is complainant is high, this country usually appears as a respondent in WTO dispute settlement involving
a LA country.

24. While final decisions of MERCOSUL dispute settlement panels ultimately are
posted on the treaty's web site, earlier stages of a dispute, including the majority of
cases that are settled prior to establishment of a panel, are far less transparent than
WTO dispute settlement, even though that system is broadly criticized for the
"confidentiality" of its proceedings. Compare http://www.mercosur.intt-generic.jsp?
contentid=374&site=l&channel=secretaria&seccion=6
with http://wto.org/english/
tratop-e/dispu~e/dispu-e.htm.
25. The Parties did not have the luxury of a slower transition because chapter 19
of the treaty divested national courts of jurisdiction over the large number of trade
remedy cases under the anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws of the Parties.
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1904, 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
26. Eduardo Grebler, Dispute Settlement: Regional Approaches 6.2 MERCOSUR,
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 23 (2003), http:ll
www.unctad.orglen/docs/edmmisc232add28-en.pdf
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TABLE

IV-03

- NUMBER OF CASES THAT INVOLVED

COMPLAINANT AS OPPOSED TO

USA

USA

AS

AS RESPONDENT

Respondent
USA

LA

Total

USA

0

20

20

LA

24

30

54

Complainant

Total
24
50
74
Source: WTO data base, organized by College of Law - University of Florida

Exploring how these cases ended, we can observe (Table IV-04)
that 20.27 per cent of cases are concluded by mutually acceptable
solution prior to issuance of a panel decision. This is high rate of
settlement, no doubt the result of the effectiveness of the WTO's
implementation system and the unofficial but operationally effective precedent set by the Appellate Body.
In other words, each side is willing to compromise its positions to a certain degree to avoid a potentially adverse holding
that is upheld by the Appellate Body to become, in essence, "WTO
law." To some degree, a high rate of settlement may also reflect
lack of confidence by the disputants in the quality of dispute resolution, that is, in the ability of WTO panels and the Appellate
Body fully to understand the complex trade rules, which they are
interpreting. In addition, as in any conflict resolution system, a
certain number of requests for consultation will have been filed
only for political effect. For example, a Member may need to placate a domestic industry bedeviled by imports or the Member may
be placing a marker for on-going or future negotiations. Our experience teaches, however, that such cases are not so numerous as to
create significant doubt in our conclusions.
TABLE

IV-04

-

NATURE OF RESOLUTION OF

WTO

DISPUTE

CASES INVOLVING LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Nature of resolution

No. of cases

Percent

Mutually acceptable solution prior to panel decision
15
20,27
Panel decision issued
59
79,73
Total
74
100,00
Source: WTO data base, organized by College of Law - University of Florida

The second important task is to identify the nature of the case's
resolution by the type of case submitted. These data are compiled
in Table IV-05. We have grouped challenges into three categories:
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(1) imposition of border or internal taxes on an imported product,
including a so-called "price band" system; (2) safeguard or escape
clauses measures imposed under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards;27 and (3) anti-dumping or countervailing duty measures
(AD/CVD) imposed under the Subsidies or Anti-dumping
Agreements .28.
TABLE

IV-05

-NATURE OF RESOLUTION OF

WTO

DISPUTE

ORGANIZED BY TYPE OF MEASURE CHALLENGED IN
CASES INVOLVING

LA

COUNTRIES

Measure challenged
Taxes & regular safeguard
tariffs
measures AD/CVD Total
6
7
2
15

Nature of resolution
Mutually acceptable solution prior to
panel decision
24
17
18
Panel decision issued
30
24
20
Total
Source: WTO data base, organized by College of Law - University of Florida

59
74

Thus, analyzing Table IV-05, we can conclude that there were
more cases settled without a panel for the trade remedy cases
than for those challenging taxes or regular tariffs. To probe the
meaning of this statistically significant difference, we summarized
in Table IV-06 the types of cases in disputes involving either two
LA countries or an LA country and the USA.
TABLE

IV-06

- TYPE OF MEASURE CHALLENGED ORGANIZED
BY DISPUTING COUNTRIES
Disputing countries

USA and Latin America
Latin America only
Measure challenged
10
20
Taxes & regular tariffs
10
14
Safeguard measures
14
6
AD/CVD
30
Total
44
Source: WTO data base, organized by College of Law - University of Florida

Total
30
24
20
74

27. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 (1994) [hereinafter
Safeguards].
28. See generally Anti-dumping Agreement, supra note 22.; See generally
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14
[hereinafter Agreement on Subsidies].
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The results summarized by Table IV-05 are interesting because
they show that only disputes involving safeguard measures are
more likely to involve two LA countries. In cases challenging all
other types of measures, the USA is at least twice as likely to be
involved. Details of the cases would be necessary to fully understand the reason for this large difference, but strictly from an
empirical level, knowing only the countries involved has predictive value as to the type of measure likely to be under review.
Reviewing our results so far, we can proffer that: a) most of
the cases submitted to WTO dispute settlement involving Latin
American countries are between one Latin American country and
the USA; b) the majority of the cases are settled by "mutually
acceptable solution" under DSU article 3.7; and c) cases challenging taxes and regular tariffs are predominant. Our exploration of
the outcome of the panel process based on the type of measure
challenged is preliminary because some of the cases in our study
still are in progress. A number of cases have been settled prior to a
panel decision and no information is available as to whether one
party can be described as having won or lost those cases.
C.

Length of time to complete panel review

In order to understand our comparison of the timelines prescribed by the DSU and the timelines that the studied cases
experienced (between the request for consultations and adoption
of the panel report by the DSB if there is no appeal), we constructed Table IV- 07 and Graph IV-01 specifying respectively how
many days the DSU prescribes for each phase and how many days
the case actually took in total to be resolved. DSU time deadlines
for a particular case are not always precisely calculable, for the
reasons explained in the notes to Table IV- 07. As a result, when
the panel, DSB, or AB is given a minimum and a maximum time
within which to act, we have used the longer time period, with the
exception of the time for establishment of a panel by the DSB, for
which we have used a mean time period.
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TIMELINE FOR EACH PHASE FROM

REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS UNTIL THE PANEL REPORT IS
ADOPTED BY THE

DSB

FOR CASES NOT APPEALED.

Phase
for consultations to request for panel
From request 29
establishment

Days prescribed by DSU
6030

From request for establishment of panel to DSB
establishment of panel

4831

From DSB establishment of panel to composition of panel

3032

From panel composition to issuance of panel's final report

27033

From issuance of panel report to DSB adoption of panel
report (if no appeal)
Total

60
468

Therefore, from the request for consultations until the panel
report is by the DSB, the DSU prescribes a maximum of 468 days.
In order to investigate if the time deadlines established by the
DSU are being met, we calculated the mean of the time between
the day that consultations were requested and the day that the
panel decision was adopted by the DSB34 (Graph 01).

29. Setting of terms of reference is automatic unless the parties agree otherwise
within 20 days from establishment, but art. 7.1 does not intend this 20-day period to
be an additional time period. DSU, supra note 16, art. 7.1.
30. DSU, supra note 16, art. 4.7.
31. DSU art. 6.1 requires establishment of a panel at the second meeting of the
DSB after the request is made. DSU, supra note 16, art. 6.1. By our calculations,
this time period can range from a minimum of 26 days to a maximum of 70 days,
depending upon the date on which the request is made (in relation to the DSB's
monthly meeting schedule) and whether complainant seeks an accelerated second
meeting of the DSB under note 5 to that article. In lieu of making an individual count
of the time for establishment of each panel (this date would be its actual DSU art. 6.1
"deadline"), we have used the median number of days.
32. DSU, supra note 16, art. 8.7.
33. DSU art. 12.8 gives the panel 180 days "as a general rule" from its composition
to issue its final report. DSU, supra note 16, art. 12.8. Under DSU art. 12.9, however,
the panel can take up to 9 months (270 days) if it tells the DSB in writing that "it
cannot issue its report within 6 months." DSU, supra note 16, art. 12.9.
34. Note also that if a panel "suspends" its proceedings at the request of a party
under Article 12.12 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, that suspended time
does not count toward the time frames established in the DSU. This rule does not
apply to any of the cases that we are analyzing. DSU, supra note 16, art. 12.12.
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In analyzing Graph IV-01, we note that: a) in general, the
length of time between the request for consultations and the adoption of the panel decision by the DSB is longer than the DSU
anticipates (except for the years 1995 and 2001); and b) the length
of time between the request for consultations and adoption of the
panel decision by the DSB had been increasing since 2001,
although after 2003, it started to decline.
Another point of interest was whether the length of time
between the request for consultations and the adoption of the
panel decision by the DSB differed if the USA was one of the parties. In order to answer this question, we calculated the mean time
between the request for consultations and adoption of the panel
decision in cases involving only Latin American countries and in
those involving the USA (Graph IV-02).

35. For this graph, we are taking into account only the cases in which the panel
report had already been adopted. Of the 59 cases that did not end through mutually
agreed solution, information is available only for 16 cases. Therefore, for the following
tables only these 16 cases are going to be analyzed.
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- MEAN LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN REQUEST

FOR CONSULTATIONS AND ADOPTION OF PANEL
REPORT, ARRANGED BY
DISPUTING COUNTRIES
680 .
670

660
650
640
630

620
USA and Latin American

Latin American only

We can conclude from Graph IV-02 that there is some difference
between the length of time for cases that involve only Latin American countries (641 days) and cases that involve one Latin American country and the USA (676 days). In any event, both time
periods are higher than the one established by the DSU (468
days).
Next, we look at whether the panel decision was appealed by
one or more of the parties involved (Graph IV-03).
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GRAPH IV-03 - FREQUENCY OF APPEAL OF PANEL DECISIONS
IN CASES INVOLVING

LA

COUNTRIES
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-

__ U Appeals

Not appealeed
Appealed
Source: WTO data base, organized by College of Law - University of Florida

Using Graph IV-03, we can see that about 78 percent of panel
decisions were appealed. Next, we look at whether the countries
involved in the dispute have an impact on whether an appeal was
filed (Graph IV-04).
GRAPH

IV-04

- APPEAL OF PANEL DECISION ORGANIZED BY
COUNTRIES INVOLVED

100
90 i
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0 by country type
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Source: WTO data base, organized by College of Law - University of Florida

Thus, Graph IV-04 demonstrates that from a total of 16 cases, 14
of the panel decisions appealed involved the USA as a party. If the
case involved only Latin American countries, it was seven times
less likely to be appealed than if the USA was one of the parties
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(12,5% vs. 87,5%) In cases involving the USA and a LA country,
the USA was the appellant 87,5% of the time (14 of 16 cases). In
other words, the USA was 1,14 times more likely to appeal than
the LA country. That the USA is more likely to find itself on the
losing end of the panel report would help explain the outsized rate
of appeal by the USA.
Analyzing appeals by year (from 1995 to 2006) confirms the
trend even more vividly (Graph IV-05).
GRAPH IV-05 - NUMBER OF APPEALS BY YEAR AND BY
COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE DISPUTE
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Source: WTO data base, organized by College of Law - University of Florida

As noted earlier, only 2 of the 16 cases appealed-one in 2000
and one in 2003-involved solely Latin American countries. 6 .
Next, we calculated the mean length of time between the
request for appellate review and the adoption of the Appellate
Body's decision. Similar to the timeline between the request for
consultations and the issuance of the final panel report, we first
determined the length of time that the DSU prescribes for this
phase (Table IV-08).

36. This statistic refers to cases in which the AB has ruled and the DSB has
adopted the report, even if the case has not "ended" because implementation issues
are still being disputed by post-dispute arbitration under DSU arts. 21 and 22.
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TIMELINE FOR EACH PHASE FROM

REQUEST FOR APPELLATE REVIEW UNTIL THE
ADOPTS THE

AB

DSB

REPORT

Phase
From issuance of final panel report to request for
appellate* reviewFrom request for appellate review to issuance of
appellates report.
From ssuance of appellate report to adoption by DSB

Days prescribed by DSU
6037
9038
3039

180
Total
Source: WTO database, organized by College of Law - University of Florida

Table IV- 08 reports that the WTO dispute resolution procedure
prescribes 180 days for the appeal phase. ° In order to analyze if
the DSB has met this deadline, for the cases where the Appellate
Body's report already has been adopted, we calculated the mean
length of time between issuance of the report and adoption of the
appellate report by the DSB. Table IV- 09 summarizes the results.
TABLE IV- 09

-LENGTH

OF TIME BETWEEN REQUEST FOR

APPELLATE REVIEW AND

DSB

ADOPTION OF THE

APPELLATE REPORT BY COUNTRIES
ENROLLED IN THE DISPUTE
Length of time
94

USA and Latin American
1

Latin American only
0

112
2
0
122
4
0
132
1
0
135
1
0
136
2
0
143
0
1
150
1
1
176
2
0
Total
14
2
Source: WTO database, organized by College of Law - University of Florida

Table IV- 9 reveals that all of the completed cases in this database
met the time deadline established by the DSU for the appeal pro37.
38.
39.
40.

DSU,
DSU,
DSU,
DSU,

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

16,
16,
16,
16,

at
at
at
at

art. 16.4.
art. 17.5.
art. 17.14.
arts. 16.4, 17.
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cess. If the point in analysis is the length of time of the average
WTO dispute resolution, using the data gathered, it is possible to
reach two conclusions. First, the DSB is generally not efficient in
meeting the established deadline for the time between the request
for consultations and release of the panel's or Appellate Body's
adopted final report -the mean amount of time was 672 days,
while the DSU mandates no more than 468 days for the process.
On the other hand, the DSB does appear to be effective in meeting
the timeline for the period between issuance of an appealed panel
report and approval of the Appellate Body report-all cases have
been handled in less than the DSU timeline of 180 days.

V.

NAFTA CHAPTER 19 -

ANTI-DUMPING AND

COUNTERVAILING DUTIES

A.

First Things

NAFTA Chapter 19, specifically Article 1904, establishes an
alternative to judicial review by domestic courts of final determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty cases (hereinafter AD/CVD), with review by independent binational panels.41
NAFTA requires member states to comply with panel conclusions
and prohibits individual state judicial review once a state requests
a NAFTA Chapter 19 panel review.42 These binational panels consist of "private trade law experts chosen by the two countries
involved in the dispute, instead of the traditional review by
national courts."43 Upon a request for a binational panel each
party must appoint two panelists within thirty days; then within
fifty-five days of the request for a panel, the parties must agree on
the fifth panelist.44 Involved parties select the panelists "on the
basis of their objectivity, reliability, sound judgment, and general
familiarity with international trade law."4 5
A party state may challenge a final AD/CVD determination
under normal judicial review procedures within the NAFTA state
if neither government requests a panel within thirty days after
receiving notice of the determination. 6 However, if a member
41. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1904(1), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
42. NAFTA, supra note 41.
43. Stephen Powell & Mark Barnett, The Role of United States Trade Laws In
Resolving the Florida-Mexico Tomato Conflict, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 319, 355 (1997).
44. NAFTA, supra note 41, annex 1901.2(2)-(3).
45. NAFTA, supra note 41, art. 1904.4, 1904.11, & 1904.12(a)
46. Id.

2011]

THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AMERICAS

219

state request a binational panel determination, NAFTA will compose the panel upon the NAFTA Secretariat's filing of a Request
for Panel Review on behalf of the state seeking the review.47 In
Mexico, the Secretaria de Economia, Unidad de Prdcticas
Comerciales Internacionales makes the dumping, subsidy, injury
determinations, and requests the binational panel determination
with the NAFTA Secretariat.4 8 For the USA, the Department of
Commerce, International Trade Administration makes the dumping and subsidy determinations "while the United States International Trade Commission conducts injury inquiries.""9 Parties
may appeal the dumping, subsidy and injury determinations of
the investigating authorities in Mexico to the Tribunal Fiscal de la
Federaci6n and in the United States to the Court of International
Trade.
Individual USA and Mexican nationals may continue to take
complaints to their respective national court systems or, instead,
may initiate Chapter 19 procedures upon request by an entity that
could sue in its national courts.5 Thus, private companies with
standing to challenge an antidumping and countervailing duty
determination in the national courts may entirely bypass judicial
review by selecting Chapter 19's binational panel system. 2 The
binational panels determine whether the investigating authority
properly applied its AD/CVD laws. 3 NAFTA creates no substantive law relating to AD/CVD, but rather relies on the importing
nations' AD/CVD duty laws when making legal determinations. 4
Therefore, panels base decisions solely on the record created dur47. Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, http:l!
www.nafta-sec-alena.orgen/view.aspx?x=226 (last modified Mar. 3, 2009).
48. Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions, supra note 47.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Patrick Macrory, NAFTA Chapter 19: A Successful Experiment in
InternationalTrade Dispute Resolution, C.D. HowE INSTITUTE No. 168, Sept. 2002, at
1.
53. Id.
54. See Stephen Powell, Expanding the NAFTA Chapter 19 Dispute Settlement
System: A Way to Declaw Trade Remedy Laws in a Free TradeArea of the Americas?,
16 L. & Bus. REV. Am. 217, 221 n.13 (2010) ("To protect against a challenge that
foreign panelists not appointed by the President would be exercising 'significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
126, 140-141 (1976), in violation of the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2, the NAFTA incorporates national AD/CVD laws of the Parties,
present and future. The U.S. position in the case of such a challenge would be that
binational panels are implementing international law. See art. 1904.2 and Statement
of Administrative Action, H.Rule 3450, 103rd Cong., Sec. 101, (1993).").
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ing the administrative process, on the standard of review, and the
general legal principles applicable to the country's courts.5" The
standard of review varies based on the respondent's legally
enacted standard of review. The USA follows the standard set in
§ 516A(b)(1)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930 and in the case of the Mexico the standard set in Article 238 of the Federal Fiscal Code
(C6digo Fiscal de la Federaci6n)5 s
The tribunal's decisions must obtain a majority vote based on
the votes of all members of the panel. 7 The panel then issues a
binding "written decision with reasons, together with any dissenting or concurring opinions of panelists." 8 Although "not bound to
follow panel decisions as precedent, [national courts] are
encouraged by national implementing legislation to view panel
decisions as persuasive authority. " " Parties may not appeal binational decisions to their respective national courts or create legislation overturning the decisions.6 °
However, an "extraordinary challenge procedure" exists
whereby a state party to the dispute may seek review upon a finding of gross misconduct, bias, or serious conflict of interest of a
panel member.6 1 Additionally, a party may obtain such review
through allegations that the final determination departs from the
rules of procedure or that the panel exceeded its power, authority
or jurisdiction and that such actions affected the final determination.6 1 In such instances, NAFTA composes a panel of three members, usually former judges, to review and make a determination
of the allegations.6 3
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

NAFTA,
NAFTA,
NAFTA,
NAFTA,
Edward

supra note 41, at art. 1904(2).
supra note 41, annex 1911 "standard of review."
supra note 41, annex 1901.2(5).
supra note 41, annex 1901.2(5),1904.9.
D. Re, International Judicial Tribunals and the Courts of the

Americas: A Comment with Emphasis on Human Rights Law, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J.

1091, 1092 (1996).
60. NAFTA, supra note 41, arts. 1904.11, 1903.1(b).
61. NAFTA, supra note 41, art. 1904(13).
62. Id. See David Gantz, Resolution of Trade Disputes Under NAFTA's Chapter 19:
The Lessons of Extending the BinationalPanel Process to Mexico, 29 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 297, 308 n.43 (1998)("Para. 5 provides in pertinent part that 'An involved Party
[the government] . . . shall on request of a person who would otherwise be entitled
under the law of the importing Party to commence domestic procedures for judicial
review of that final determination, request a review.' In other words, when one of the
private interested parties requests a panel review, the government (involved Party)
must implement the request. In contrast, in para. 13, there is no mandatory role for
the private interested parties; the government (Party) decides whether to lodge an
extraordinary challenge.").
63. NAFTA, supra note 41, at art. 1904(13); Gantz, supra note 62.
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As of January 1, 2010, twenty-eight recorded cases exist
under NAFTA Chapter 19 between the USA and Mexico.
TABLE

V-01

- COMPLAINANTS AND RESPONDENTS UNDER

CHAPTER 19
Frequency

Percent

Mexico v. USA

17

60.7

USA v. Mexico

7

25

Canada v. Mexico

2

7.1

Mexico v. Canada

2

7.1

28

100

Complainant v Respondent

Total

TABLE

V-02 - CASES BETWEEN USA AND MEXICO ISSUED
19 AND ANALYZED IN THIS PAPER

UNDER CHAPTER

Frequency

Percent

OCTG (AD)
Bovine (AD)

2
1

8.33
4.17

Cement (4th AR)

1

4.17

Cement (5th AR)

1

4.17

Cement (6th AR)

1

4.17

Cement (7th AR)
Cement (9th AR)

1
1

4.17
4.17

Cement (AD)

1

4.17

Cookware (9th AR)

1

4.17

Cookware (AD)

1

4.17

Corn Syrup (AD)

1

4.17

Cut-to-Length Plate (AD)
Flat Coated Steel (AD)

1
1

4.17
4.17

Flowers (AD)
Gray Portland Cement (AD)

1
1

4.17
4.17

Leather Wearing (CVD)

1

4.17

OCTG (4th AR)

1

4.17

OCTG (5 yr)

1

4.17

Polystyrene (AD)

1

4.17

Sodium Hydroxide (CVD)

1

4.17

Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip (5yr)

1

4.17

Steel Pipe (AD)

1

4.17

1

4.17

24

100

Case

Urea (AD)
Total
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C. Timeline of Binational Panel Determinations
NAFTA Chapter 19 cases begin with an initial petition by the
complainant requesting a binational panel to resolve the dispute.'
Following the date of publication of the final determination in the
official journal of the importing Party, the claimant must request
a panel in writing within thirty days.6" Therefore, claims arising
under Chapter 19 may come forth only after a primary decision in
the matter. In the case of final determinations not published in
the official journal of the importing Party, the importing Party
must immediately notify the other involved Party of such final
determination where it involves goods from the other involved
Party.66 The other involved Party may request a panel within 30
days of receipt of such notice. The panel may uphold a final
determination, or remand it for action not inconsistent with the
panel's decision. 8 Where the panel remands a final determination, the panel is asked to establish as brief a time as reasonable
for compliance with the remand.69 NAFTA designed the rules to
result in final decisions within 315 days of the date on which a
Party requests a panel.70 See Table V-03.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

NAFTA,
NAFTA,
Id.
Id.
NAFTA,
Id.
NAFTA,

supra note 41, art. 1904(1).
supra note 41, art. 1904(4).
supra note 41, art.1904(8).
supra note 41, art. 1904(14).
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TABLE V-03 - IDEAL TIMELINE FOR A NAFTA CHAPTER
71
PANEL REVIEW UNDER THE RULES OF PROCEDURE
Rule 34
Rule 39

Request for Panel Review filed
Complaints to be filed

Rule 40

be filed
Notices of Appearance to b

223
19

Day 0
Within 30 days after Request for
Panel Review
Within 45 days after Request for
Panel Review

Annex 1901.2(3)

Panel Selection to be completed
by the Parties by

Day 55

Rule 41

Final Determination, Reasons,
Within 15 days after filing of
Index and Administrative Record Notice of Appearance
to be filed

Annex 1901.2(3)

Parties to select 5th Panelist by

Day 61

Rule 57 (1)

Briefs by Complainants to be
filed

Within 60 days after filing of
Administrative Record

Rule 57(2)

Briefs by Investigating Authority Within 60 days after
Br
Copinas
or Participants in support to be
Briefs
Complainants'
filed

Rule 57(3)

Reply Briefs to be filedBre

Within 15 days after Authority's

Rule 57(4)

Appendix to the Briefs to be filed

Within 10 days after Reply
Biefs
Briefs

Rule 67(l)

Oral Argument to begin

Within 30 days after Reply
Briefs

04.14
Arte190

PANEL DECISION DUE
P
L D
O

315 days after Request for Panel
Review

Brief

Regarding the length of time for USA-Mexico AD/CVD cases
between the date of Request for Panel Review and the date that
the tribunal issued a final panel decision, on average, the tribunal
took 1,029 days to reach its final decision. From time of request
for panel review, the binational process took 1,282 days to reach a
final determination. No case met the required NAFTA deadline of
dispute panel resolution within 315 days of after Request for
Panel Review. The data also illustrate a 276-day gap between the
date the binational tribunal issues a final decision and the date
that the NAFTA Secretariat terminates the panel upon completion of its work, as noted below. This is time for the administrative agency to implement the remand and for the binational panel
to approve the results.
71. Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions, supra note 47.
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TABLE

V-04

- AVERAGE TIME TO COMPLETE PRINCIPAL
PHASES OF CHAPTER

Mean Time

Number
of Cases

19

Minimum Maximum

Std.
Mean Deviation

Between the request for panel and
the final decision

21

363

2599

1029

630

Between the request for panel and
the date that the case terminated

24

363

2760

1282

741

Between the final decision and the
date that the case terminated

21

0

1151

276

322

The average time between request for panel review and issuance of a final decision is more than one thousand days. See Table
V- 05. Considering that NAFTA prescribes 315 days to reach a
final determination, the data show that NAFTA lacks the ability
to conclude cases under Chapter 19 within the 315 day requirement. The following table provides greater detail with respect to
compliance with the initial panel decision by the administrative
agency.
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V-05 - DECISION OF BINATIONAL PANELS ISSUED
UNDER CHAPTER 19 BY LENGTH OF TIME TO REACH

TABLE

FINAL DECISION

72

Mean Time
between Panel
Request and Case
Termination

Number
of
Cases

Panel remanded the case to the InvestigatingS Authority.

2028

2

Panel ordered partial remand and affirmed some$ of the issues-

1676

1

Panel unanimously remanded the Agency's* Determination-

1578

3

Panel unanimously affirmed in part and remandedt in part the
Agency's determination..

1543

5

Panel upheld the Final Determination in part ands remanded in
part-

1320

1

Panel decided that it lacked competence to reviews the final
determination-

1260

1

Panel unanimously affirmed the agency'st determination.

1253

2

Data about the panel were not available

1137

2

Panel unanimously affirmed the Commission'st Review
Determination-

1120

1

Panel, with one partial dissent, remanded thet Agency's
determination-

1010

1

Panel unanimously remanded the determinations to the agency
twice-

1000

1

Panel affirmed the final determination

643

1

Panel unanimously affirmed, with one partials dissent, the
Agency's determination-

575

1

Panel unanimously, with one concurring opinion of two panelists,
affirmed in part and remanded in* part, the agency's
determination-

527

1

Panel remanded the Final Determination to thet Administrative
Authority.

363

1

Total

1282

24

Description of the Panel Decision

As the chart makes clear, categorization of the panel process after
the initial decision is difficult.
72. NAFTA Chapter 19 creates the following rule for affirming, remanding, and
denying a final determination: "The panel may uphold a final determination, or
remand it for action not inconsistent with the panel's decision. Where the panel
remands a final determination, the panel shall establish as brief a time as is

reasonable for compliance with the remand, taking into account the complexity of the
factual and legal issues involved and the nature of the panel's decision. In no event

shall the time permitted for compliance with a remand exceed an amount of time
equal to the maximum amount of time (counted from the date of the filing of a

petition, complaint or application) permitted by statute for the competent
investigating authority in question to make a final determination in an investigation.
If review of the action taken by the competent investigating authority on remand is
needed, such review shall be before the same panel, which shall normally issue a final
decision within 90 days of the date on which such remand action is submitted to it."
NAFTA, supra note 41, art. 1904.8.
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A number of factors explain, although they do not justify, the
extraordinary delays in reaching the end of binational panel litigation. Most are beyond control of the panels themselves. As
noted, panelists are chosen ad hoc for each request for panel
review among private individuals supposedly schooled in international law, preferably international trade law. During the early
years, such individuals were few in number, which caused substantial delay in panel selection. Another reason, one endemic to
an ad hoc system, is that a panelist, once chosen, may discover,
upon further study of the pleadings, a conflict of interest with
respect to one or more issues in the case73 . The pool of panelists is
composed primarily of practicing attorneys, among whom a conflict is always possible.
Sometimes governments delay appointment of panelists for
political reasons (usually trade-related), in much the same way a
U.S. Senator may block all judicial appointments until the administration takes action on a personal imperative. Recognizing that
such delays are contrary to the objectives of Chapter 19 will not
prevent them from recurring, often accounting for hundreds of
days in establishment of a panel.
While the treaty provides substantial time for the panel to
deliberate and issue its decision and for the administrative agency
to comply with any remand instructions, in fact, the remand procedure has demanded far more time than anticipated for both of
the USA and the Mexican authorities. Apparently, no one anticipated that two and sometimes three remands would be necessary
to force compliance with the panel's holdings, even though such a
situation is not uncommon in at least USA courts. More troubling
73. Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Remedies Against Unfair InternationalTrade Practices,in
1 L. INT'L TRADE sec. 16.26 (2011), available at https://web2.westlaw.com/result/
default.wl?cfid=l&mt=LawSchool&origin=Search&sri=70&sskey=CLIDSSSA8120
3211017108&query=%22CONFLICT+OF+INTEREST%22+%26+%22NAFTA+

CHAPTER+19%22&method=TNC&db=TP-ALL&rlt=CLIDQRYRLT278272110171
08&rltdb=CLIDDB1 187211017108&service=Search&eq=Welcome%2fLawSchool&
rp=%2fWelcome%2fLawSchool%2fdefault.wl&srch=TRUE&vr=2.0&action=Search&
sv=Split&fmqv=s&fn=_top&utid=1&rs=LAWS2.0; also availab le as SMO 53-ALIABA 93, sec. 5(b)(2), see https://web2.westlaw.com/result/default.wl?rs=WLW11.
07&cnt=DOC&srch=TRUE&cfid=l&method=TNC&service=Search&sri=70&
fn=-top&sskey=CLIDSSSA53320171717108&n=l&fmqv=s&action=Search&origin=
Search&vr=2.0&rlt=CLIDQRYRLT438181717108&query=%22CONFLICT+OF+
INTEREST%22+%26+%22NAFTA+CHAPTER+19%22&mt=LawSchool&rlti=1&db=
TP-ALL&rp=%2fWelcome%2fLawSchool%2fdefault.wl&rltdb=CLIDDB7030517171
7108&eq=Welcome%2fLawSchool&utid=1&sv=Split; Leon E. Trakman, Resolving
Trade Disputes: LearningFrom The Nafta 12, available at
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has been the open defiance by agencies in both countries in the
most hotly contested disputes.
VI.

1.

THE CASE OF

MERCOSUL

Background

Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, through the 1991
Treaty of Asunci6n, devised a Regional Trade Agreement,
MERCOSUL,74 in an attempt to liberalize trade in South America
through the tariff-free circulation of goods and services. 75 Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru hold associate membership
allowing the States to join individual free trade agreements
within MERCOSUL. 6 Venezuela is apparently on the path of
integration into the agreement with a recent agreement in
Paraguay.7 7
The Treaty of Asunci6n calls for the coordination of each
Member State to pass appropriate legislation in the pertinent
areas of MERCOSUL to harmonize each State's trade policies.
The Member States assume the Protocol of Brasilia," establishing
arbitration procedures, and the Protocol of Ouro Preto, 79 implementing the governing body of MERCOSUL. Although the Treaty
of Asunci6n provides some basic dispute resolution guidelines, the
Protocol of Brasilia implements a more comprehensive dispute
resolution system through the Common Market Group ° (hereinaf74. See MERCOSUR, http://www.MERCOSURule.org.uy/ (last visited April 20,
2011) (providing a general historical background of the Treaty of Asunci6n ); Treaty
Establishinga Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the FederalRepublic
of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, SICE
FOREIGN

TRADE

INFORMATION

SYSTEM,

http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/

mrcsrtoc.asp (last visited April 20, 2011) (translating the Treaty of Asunci6n into
English).
75. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Ura., Mar. 26, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp
[hereinafter Treaty of Asunci6n].
76. MERCOSUR, Common Market of the South - Profile, BBC NEWS (Jun. 16,
2010, 14:38 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5195834.stm.
77. Paraguay Finally Says 'Aye' to Venezuela's Mercosur Full Membership,
MERCOPRESS (Dec. 13, 2010, 23:26 UTC), http://en.mercopress.com/2010/12/13/
paraguay-finally-says-aye-to-venezuela-s-mercosur-full-membership.
78. Protocol of Brasilia for the Solution of Controversies, Dec. 17, 1991, 36 I.L.M.
691, 693, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/brasilia/pbrasilia-e.asp
[hereinafter Protocol of Brasilia].
79. Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunci6n on the Institutional Structure of
MERCOSUR, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1244, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
trade/mrcsr/ourop/ourop-e.asp [hereinafter Protocol of Ouro Preto].
80. As the executive branch of MERCOSUL, the CMG consists of four members
and four alternates from each country representing the public bodies of the Ministry
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ter CMG). The CMG holds the authority to resolve disputes, however, if the CMG fails to resolve the dispute the Protocol calls for
the creation of an Ad Hoc Court, to hear and rule on the States
dispute."' In recognition of the need to "guarantee the correct
interpretation, application and enforcement of the fundamental
instruments of the process of integration and the regulations of
MERCOSUL, in a consistent and systematic way," the Protocol of
Olivos constructs a Permanent Review Court with the authority to
review holdings of the CMG and Ad Hoc Courts. 2
B.

MERCOSUL Structure, Jurisdiction,and Forum
Selection

MERCOSUL consists of several governing bodies: the Common Market Council (hereinafter CMC),83 the CMG, the
MERCOSUL Trade Commission, 4 the Permanent Review Court, 5
the Joint Parliamentary Commission,86 the Economic Social Con-

of Foreign Affairs, he Ministry of Economy, or the Central Bank. CMG duties consist
of monitoring compliance with the treaty, taking steps to enforce the holdings of the
Council of the common market, proposing measures to further liberalize trade,
coordinate macroeconomic policies and negotiate agreements with third-parties, and
to draw up programs of work to ensure progress towards the formation of the common
market. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 75, at art. 13.
81. The Protocol of Brasilia Ch. 2 Art. 2-3, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
trade/mrcsr/brasilia/pbrasilia-e.asp#CHAPTER IIH_ (last visited Aug. 14, 2010).
82. Olivos Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes in Mercosur, Preamble, Feb. 18,
2002, 42 I.L.M. 2 (2002)[hereinafter Olivos Protocol].
83. As the highest governing body, the CCM is responsible for the "political
leadership of the integration process and for making the holdings necessary to ensure
the achievement of the objectives defined by the Treaty of Asuncion." Treaty of
Asunci6n, supra note 75. Additionally the CCM's duties consist of formulating
policies that promote the building of a common market, assuming the legal
personality of MERCOSUL, negotiating and signing agreements on behalf of
MERCOSUL with third countries and international organizations, ruling on
proposals submitted by the CMG, and clarifying the substance and scope of its
holdings. As with the CMG, the CCM's holdings bind State parties.
84. The MERCOSUL Trade Commission assists the CMG in policing the
realization of MERCOSUL trade policy. See Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 79, at
art. 16-21.
85. Olivos Protocol, supra note 82.
86. The MERCOSUL Parliament replaced the Joint Parliamentary Commission.
See http://200.40.51.218/SAM/GestDocPubWeb.nsf/Normativa?ReadForm&lang=
ESP&id=DB44183BFF1899F90325760800546686&lang=. Available only in Spanish
or Portugese.
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sultative Forum," and the MERCOSUL Secretariat. 8 Only the
first four MERCOSUL organs hold the decision making power.8 9
MERCOSUL maintains two separate jurisdictions; labor dispute
jurisdiction 90 and jurisdiction over causes of action between Member States. 91 Since no court holdings exist in the labor dispute
jurisdiction, this paper will focus on MERCOSUL's jurisdiction
over Member States.
The Protocol of Ouro Preto establishes jurisdiction over
causes of action between Member States, a Member State and a
private party, and those involving private parties domiciled in a
Member State.9 2 Member States retain the right to mutually
choose the forum in which to bring the dispute. 93 Once the Member States begin a cause of action in one forum, the parties may
not submit the same cause of action in another forum.94 No
requirement exists in MERCOSUL demanding that States resolve
disputes within the dispute resolution system of MERCOSUL,
thus this potentially weakens MERCOSUL's authority over Member States. 95
87. Composed of representatives of the social and economic sectors of the Member
States, the Economic Social Consultative Forum guarantees the participation of the
civil society in the integration process of MERCOSUL initiatives. Protocol of Ouro
Preto, supra note 79, art. 28-30.
88. The Secretariat's principal functions include safeguarding documents and
information on the activities of MERCOSUL, rendering operational support and
services for the other agencies, and publishing the Official Bulletin of MERCOSUL.
Nddia de Arafijo, Dispute Resolution in MERCOSUL: The Protocol of Las Lefias and
the Case Law of the Brazilian Supreme Court, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 25, 3132 (2001).
89. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 79, art. 2.
90. Common Market Group, Normas GeneralesRelativas a los Funcionariosde la
Sam, art. 56, MERCOSUR/GMC/RES No. 42/97 (Sept. 5, 1997), available at http://
www.mercosur.int/show?contentid=3091.
91. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 79, art. 43.
92. Araiijo, supra note 88, at 36.
93. Olivos Protocol, supra note 82, art. 1(2).
94. Id.
95. Mario Viola de Azevedo Cunha, The JudicialSystem of MERCOSUR: Is There
Administrative Justice?, THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE, NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Nov. 2007, available at http://www.iilj.org/GALI
documents/cunha.pdf. "The [Protocol of Olivos] contains explicit provisions regarding
the need for selecting the forum before which the conflicts will be settled. The Protocol
of Brasilia Protocol did not account for this aspect, which, for example, has permitted
that in light of the application of antidumping measures by Argentina regarding the
importation of Brazilian poultry, Brazil first raise the complaint with Argentina
within the scope of the Protocol of Brasilia and then, not having had its expectations
satisfied, it raised the issue to the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute
Settlement Body. With respect to this, the Protocol of Olivos establishes that if a
controversy can be submitted either to the controversy resolution system of

230

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:2

C. Dispute Resolution by the Common Market Group
Annex III of the Treaty of Asunci6n requires direct negotiations between disputing parties before submitting the dispute to
the CMG.9" This Annex grants the CMG 60 days to decide the
matter, after which, the CMG's holding binds all State parties."
However, if the CMG fails to reach a resolution, the CMG turns
the matter over to the CCM to adopt relevant recommendations of
the CMG.9" Thus, the Treaty of Asunci6n limits conflict resolution
to inter-party negotiations and submittal of the issue before the
CMG for a resolution.
Ruling on only nine cases over the past nineteen years, the
CMG's rulings consist of anti-dumping, lack of incorporation of
MERCOSUL rules, MERCOSUL trade safeguards, and tariff
restrictions. A majority of the disputes-seven out of the nineinvolve Argentina as the complainant or respondent and five of
the nine disputes involve both Argentina and Brazil. The available data reveals only the types of measures challenged and the
nature of the final resolution of the dispute. No data exist as to
the length of time that the CMG takes to arbitrate a dispute. The
specificity of each subject in the disputes, accompanied with the
State legislation at issue, prevents the compilation of an effective
summary in terms of decision and implementation. However,
because data are not publically available concerning MERCOSUL
decisions, we have constructed a composite of the main issues in
each of the nine cases in an attempt to tease conclusions
therefrom.

MERCOSUL or to that of the WTO, the plaintiff state must select one of these
mechanisms, permanently waiving access to the other forum." CELINA PENA &
RICARDO ROZEMBERG, MERCOSUR: A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 10 (FOCAL 2005), availableat http://www.focal.ca/en/publications/203policy-papers-a-briefs-2005.

96. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 75, Annex III(1).
97. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 79.
98. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 80, Annex III(1).
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CMG

ARBITRATION SYSTEM BY COUNTRIES INVOLVED
IN DISPUTE

Complainant v. Respondent

Frequency

Brazil v. Argentina

2

Argentina v. Brazil

3

Argentina v. Uruguay

1

Uruguay v. Argentina

1

Uruguay v. Brazil

1

Paraguay v. Uruguay

1

Argentina not only is the most litigious of the Member States,
accounting for 44 percent of the cases (4/9), but it is also the most
often sued country, serving as respondent in one-third of cases (3/
9). Argentina and Brazil have been on one side or the other in
more than half of the total cases (5/9, 55 percent)-no surprise
given their competitive trade history as the largest MERCOSUL
Members. Surprisingly, the smallest Member, Uruguay, has been
involved as complainant or respondent in almost half of the cases
(4/9, 44 percent). Paraguay has kept its head low with its involvement in just over 10 percent of cases (1/9).
TABLE VI- 02 - SUMMARY OF DISPUTES UNDER THE CMG
ARBITRATION SYSTEM
Type of Dispute

Countries
Involved

Description of Dispute

Laws at Issue

The CMG determines that no specific MERCOSUL norms regulate
antidumping within MERCOSUL
intra-zone commerce. Thus, the
CMG decides in favor of Argentina Resolution 574 of 2000 from thet
on the basis that the internal
Anti-Dumping Brazil v.
Argentina

Lack of
Incorp. of
MERCOSUL
Rules

Argentina
v. Brazil

Argentine measures as apply at
the domestic level do not constitute a violation of the rule imposing the free circulation of goods
within MERCOSUL. Consequently, the CMG holds that the
challenged resolution complies
with MERCOSUL law.

the Argentine antidumping export
measures for poultry meat coming
from Brazil.

The CMG confirms Brazil's obligation to incorporate the CMG's Resolutions into its internal legal
Group Resolutions Nos. 48/96, 87/
system. The CMG grants Brazil
96, 14/96, 156/96, and 71198
120 days to comply with the hold-

ing.
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Laws at Issue

Law No. 8.171 of January 17 of
1991 and Inter-ministry Letters
No. 657 of 1991 and No. 182sof
ro. 182 of
2of 199 a
Argentina questions four Brazilian No.
from the Brazil1994
of
22
August
to
reference
in
internal measures
ian government regarding the
pork meat export and Brazilian
Brazilian perk proapplication of the Corn Public
subsidies for BStocks
System; Law 9.198 of June
ducers.
1 of 1991 which enacted the
Exports Financing Program
(PROEX)

Safeguards

Safeguards

Tariff
Restrictions

Brazil v.
Argentina

The CMG defines the term "controversy" according to international law principles (using ICJ
Reports). The CMG holds that the
Resolution 861 of 1999 incompatible with Annex IV of the Treaty of
Asunci6n and with general
MERCOSUL rules. CMG orders
its revocation. The award establishes a period of 15 days for the
parties to comply with the holding.

Argentina
v.
Uruguay

The CMG orders Uruguay to eliminate the tax benefits of Law
13.695 and complementary decrees
regarding industrialized wool
products exports to MERCOSUL
Member States. The CMG orders
Uruguay to revoke the measure
within fifteen days from the date
of the award.

Argentina
v. Brazil

Letters No. 37 of December 17,
1997 and No. 7 of February 20 of
1998 from the Department of ForArgentina claims that non-autoeign Trade Operations (Departamatic import licenses or import
mento de Operaciones de Comercio
licenses subject to conditions that Exterior (DECEX) of the Secretariat of Foreign Commerce
Brazil imposes amounts to nontariff restrictions affecting the
(Secretaria de Comercio Exterior
reciprocal commerce of the Treaty (SECEX), which according to
of Asuncion.
Argentina provides for the application of restrictive measures on the
reciprocal trade between Argentina and Brazil.

Resolution 861 of 1999 from the
Ministry of Economy and Public
Works and Services, which establishes annual quotas on cotton
textiles from Brazil

Law 13.695 of October 24, 1968
"Stimulus System for Wool Industrialization" and complementary
decrees ofUruguay

The CMG determines that the
Argentine Resolution (without distinguishing which resolution in
Tariff
Restrictions

Tariff
Restrictions

Uruguay
v.
Argentina

Uruguay
v. Brazil

particular) violates MERCOSUL
rules
and impedes
the free
of Uruguayan
bicycles
to theaccess

Resolutions 335 of 1999, 857 of
and
1008 of 2001
Federal
Ans1008
of
001 ffrom theeFede

Argentinean market. The CMG
orders its revocation and grants a
period of 15 days to comply.

Administration of Public Revenue

The CMG declares on January 9, Resolution No. 8 of September 25
2002, that the Brazilian legislaof 2000 from the Secretariat of
tion affecting preexisting commer- or
Com
the
Mistry
of the Ministry
Commerce
Foreign
violates
exchange
cial intra-zone
Industry and ForDevelopment,
MERCSUL
aw.The MG gvesof
MER OSUL law.
s The
c 0MG
p
eign Trade (SECEX
e
Brazil sixty days to comply.
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Type of Dispute

Tariff
Restrictions

Countries
Involved

Paraguay
v.
Uruguay

Description of Dispute
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Laws at Issue

Uruguay's domestic laws regarding the application of the "Internal
Specific Tariff' and the method of Uruguay's domestic laws regarding the application of the "Internal
calculating the tariff constitute
and the method of
Specific Tariff"
and violate
trade discrimination The
calculating said tariff.
CMG
MERCOSUL rules.
orders Uruguay to stop the discrimination against imported cigarettes from Paraguay.

D. Dispute Resolution by the Ad Hoc Court
Adopted concurrently with the Treaty of Asunci6n, the Protocol of Brasilia 99 grants further dispute settlement by allowing the
formation of an Ad Hoc Court if parties first meet the Annex III
requirements of (1) negotiating a settlement'01 and (2) submittal of
the dispute to the CMG and the CMG's failure to reach a conclusion on whole or part of the matter.' Parties to the dispute may
submit the cause of action to the Administrative Secretariat of
MERCOSUL who will then immediately notify the other States
party to the dispute and the CMG of the cause of action. 1 2 Each
MERCOSUL State must maintain a list of ten nominated arbitrators to constitute an Ad Hoc Court.'013 The Court will consist of
three arbitrators and one alternate. 04 Upon submission of an
issue to an Ad Hoc Court, each disputing State must elect one
arbitrator from the State's list of ten arbitrators.0 5 Together the
disputing States must then agree on a third arbitrator to preside
over the dispute.0 6 The responsibilities of the Ad Hoc Court
include (1) resolving controversies between the States or individuals of the States, (2) dictating temporary injunctions or orders, (3)
clarifying the issues of the dispute, (4) resolving differences over
the implementation of the judgment, and (5) pronouncing the compensatory measures States must take and any other award to the
harmed party or parties. 07
99. Protocol of Brasilia, supra note 82. The Olivos Protocol amended and added
additional provisions regarding the Ad Hoc Courts.
100. Protocol of Brasilia, supra note 78, at art. 2-3.
101. Id. art. 4-6.
102. Id. art. 7.
103. Id. art. 10.
104. Id. art. 9.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Introducci6n, MERCOSUR, http://www.MERCOSURuleint/t-generic.jsp?
contentid=374&site=l&channel=secretaria&seccion=6 (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
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Hoc

COURT

PROVISIONS, PROCEDURES, AND TIMELINE ACCORDING

TO THE PROTOCOL OF BRASILIA AND THE
PROTOCOL OF OLIVOS.
Provision

Procedure

Timeline

If State parties fail to resolve the dispute
through negotiations or the aid of the CMG,
then any of the State Parties to the controversy
NOTIFICATION OF INTENT may resort to the arbitral procedure.
Protocol of Brasilia
Chapter IV, Art. 7

TO SUBMIT DISPUTE TO
AD Hoc COURT

The Secretariat notifies the other Members
party to the controversy and the CMG.
Secretariat conducts an Ad Hoc Court.

Protocol of Brasilia
Chapter IV, Art. 9
COMPOSITION OF COURT
Protocol of Brasilia
Chapter IV, Art. 10
LIST OF ARBITRATORS
Protocol of Brasilia
Chapter IV, Art. 12
FAILURE TO SELECT
THIRD ARBITRATOR
Protocol of Brasilia
Chapter IV, Art. 14

THIRD PARTIES
Protocol of Brasilia
Chapter IV, Art. 18

Secretariat composes ad Hoc court of 3
arbitrators. Each Party to the controversy
designates 1 arbitrator. The third arbitrator, not
a national of the Parties, is designated jointly
presides.

State parties name the
arbitrators at the end
of 15 days from the
Secretariat's
notifications.

Each Member creates a list of 10 arbitrators.
Member States may elect arbitrators from this
list and must communicate any changes of the
list to the Secretariat.
If State parties fail to agree on the selection of a
third arbitrator within the time limit in
Article 9 (15 days), the Secretariat will
designate the arbitrator by lottery from among a
list of 16 arbitrators named by the CMG.
If two or more State parties maintain the same
position in a dispute, parties will unify their
representation and designate one arbitrator
jintly.

Parties must designate
arbitrator jointly within
15 days.

The Ad Hoc Court may issue temporary
injunction orders upon a showing of immediate
irreparable harm.

INJUNCTIONS

Protocol of Brasilia
Chapter IV, Art. 19
CONTROLLING LAW
Protocol of Brasilia
Chapter IV, Art. 20
ARBITRAL AWARD

Protocol of Brasilia
Chapter IV, Art. 21
COMPLIANCE WITH

COURT HOLDING

Arbitral Court will decide the controversy based
on the Treaty of Asuncion, other agreements,
the decisions of the CCM, the resolutions of the
CMG, as well as on relevant principles and
decisions of international law.
The Ad Hoc Arbitral
Court must issue its
holding within 60 days,
which may be extended
for an additional 30
days, from the time the
President of the Court
accepts his or her
designation.
Decisions of the Ad Hoc Court bind all parties to Parties must comply
with the holding of
the dispute
the Court within 15
days, unless the Court
affixes a different time
limit.
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Provision
Protocol of Brasilia
Chapter IV, Art. 22

Procedure

Timeline

During the clarification procedure the Ad Hoc
Court may suspend the holding until the Court
issues a clarification of the holding.

State parties may
request a clarification of
the holding within 15
days of its issuance.
The Court must
respond within 15
days.

If a Party fails to comply with Court holding,
the other Parties may adopt temporary
compensatory measures, such as the suspension
of concessions to encourage compliance,

Harmed State party
may not use
compensatory measures
until 30 days after the

CLARIFICATION OF

HOLDING

Protocol of Brasilia
Chapter IV, Art. 23
FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH HOLDING

235

issuance of the holding
or clarification of the
holding.
Award must be
complied with within
30 days after its
notification or within
the period established
by the Court

Protocol of Olivos
Chapter VIII, Art. 29
COMPLIANCE WITH
COURT

If the State benefiting from the award considers Notification must be
Protocol of Olivos
that the measures adopted by the other party
within 30 days after
Chapter VIH Art. 30
the adoption on
DISCREPANCY AS TO THE are not in compliance, it notifies the Ad Hoc
ENFORCEMENT OF THE
AWARD

Arbitral Court or Permanent Review Court.

measures.
The Court must decide
the matter within 30
days from the
notification.

Protocol of Olivos
Chapter IX Art. 31
COMPENSATORY
MEASURES

If an involved State does not totally comply with
the award within one year, the other State may
implement temporary compensatory measures
tending to attain compliance with the award,

The award must be
complied with within
one year from the
day following the
period established by
the corresponding
Court, or in lieu of
this period, the
following day after 30
days from the award
notification.
The State implementing
the temporary
compensatory measures
must notify the other
State at least 15 days
before their
implementation.

Protocol of Olivos
Chapter IX Art. 32
CHALLENGING OF
COMPENSATORY
MEASURES

The State against whom temporary
compensatory measures are implemented may
challenge them if it considers that it
satisfactorily complied with the award

Challenge must be
made within 15 days
after the other State
notified the temporary

compensatory measures
implementation.
The corresponding Ad
Hoc Arbitral Court
must decide the matter
within 30 days after its
constitution.
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PRIVATE PARTY

COMPLAINTS
Protocol of Olivos
Chapter XI, Art. 42
INTERVENTION OF THE
CMG AND GROUP OF

Timeline

Procedure

Provision
Protocol of Olivos
Chapter XI, Art. 39,
40, 41

Natural persons and Private companies affected If the claim is not
by legal or administrative measures taken by a solved by consultations
within 15 after the
Member State in violation of the Treaty of
complaint notification,
Asuncion may file a complaint before the
the National Section
National Section of the CMG of the State were
may transfer the claim
they reside.
directly to the CMG
The CMG may reject the complaint or
immediately convene a group of experts who
should then issue a report regarding the validity
of the complaint,

EXPERT REPORTS

The report from the
group of experts must
be issued within a

period not to exceed
30 days following their
designation.

EXPERTS REPORT
Protocol of Olivos
Chapter XI, Art. 44
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If the Group of Experts unanimously determines
in its report the validity of the complaint made
against a State Party, any other State Party can
then demand the adoption of corrective
measures or the annulment of the disputed
measure,
If Group of Experts' report is not unanimous,
the CMG must immediately conclude the
complaint procedure.

If this demand is not
met within a 15 day
period, the demanding
State may then proceed
directly to the arbitral
procedure.

The Protocol of Brasilia includes the requirements of Annex III of
direct negotiations for a maximum period of fifteen days and arbitration by the CMG, but also provides a provision establishing an
Ad Hoc Court to rule on a dispute at the request of State parties. 108
The data available show that Ad Hoc Courts resolved ten Member
State disputes since 1991. As with the CMG cases, Argentina was
party to a majority of the disputes (Table VI-04, 7/10, 70 percent).
In addition, a majority of the disputes again concern tariff restrictions (Table VI-05, 5/10, 50 percent).
TABLE VI-

04

- COUNTRIES PARTY TO THE DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT UNDER THE PROTOCOL OF BRASILIA

Countries Party to the Dispute

Number of cases

Argentina v. Brazil

3

Brazil v. Argentina

2

Uruguay v. Argentina

1

Uruguay v. Brazil

2

Paraguay v. Uruguay
Argentina v. Uruguay

1
1

Total

108. See Protocol of Brasilia, supra note 78, arts. 3, 7.

10
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TABLE

VI- 05 - TYPE OF DISPUTES AT ISSUE UNDER THE
PROTOCOL OF BRASILIA

Type of case

Frequency

Tariff Restrictions

5

Safeguards

3

Anti-dumping

1

Lack of Incorporation of MERCOSUL rules

1

Total

10

For several of the cases, information exists as to the date the
court's president received the dispute, the date MERCOSUL
formed the court, and the date that the dispute ended. Using this
information, we can analyze the length of time of each phase of
the dispute process. However, in half of the disputes no information exists as to when the president received the dispute. Therefore, the time calculations of these cases consist only of the date
MERCOSUL formed the court and the date the dispute ended. On
average, the dispute resolution process takes 141 days to obtain a
decision. Cases concerning the implementation of MERCOSUL
trade safeguards take approximately 100 more days to resolve
than the average.
TABLE VI-

06

- LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN CONSTITUTION OF

THE AD HOC COURT AND END OF DISPUTE BY
MEASURE CHALLENGED
Type of Dispute
Anti-dumping
Lack of Incorporation of MERCOSUL rules
Safeguards
Tariff Restrictions
Total

E.

Mean Time
75
113
240
101

Number of Disputes
1
1
3
5

141

10

Dispute Review by the PermanentReview Court

The 2002 Protocol of Olivos embraces additional dispute resolution procedures then that of Annex III, the Protocol of Brasilia,
and the Protocol of Ouro Preto. The Protocol sets up a review of
CMG and Ad Hoc Court holdings through the formation of the
Permanent Review Court that consists of three arbitrators; one
from each disputing MERCOSUL State and a third arbitrator
decided upon jointly. Any party utilizing the Ad Hoc Court or
CMG arbitration may submit a motion to review a holding within
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15 days of the judgment. The Permanent Review Court must limit
its holding to the issues addressed by the CMG and Ad Hoc
Court's original holding. 10 9 The holding of the Permanent Review
Court binds all State parties, preventing parties from any further
appeal of the holding.110
TABLE VI-

07 -PERMANENT COURT OF REVIEW OF

PROVISIONS, PROCEDURES AND TIMELINE
Provision

Procedure

Protocol of
Olivos

Timeline
Parties must file motion for review
within 15 days of Ad Hoc Court
holding.

Ch. 7 Art. 17
MOTION FOR

REVIEW

Protocol of
Olivos
Ch. 7 Art. 18
COMPOSITION OF
PERMANENT

Permanent Review court to consist of
5 arbitrators. One from each of the
four original MERCOSUR States and
a fifth decided upon jointly. Each
State shall nominate 2 arbitrators to
compose the list from which the fifth
arbitrator is chosen.

The arbitrator and alternate may
serve for a 2-year term and such
position is renewable up to 2 more
terms. The fifth arbitrator is to serve
a non-renewable 3-year term.

REVIEW COURT

Protocol of
Olivos
Ch. 7 Art. 20

When the dispute includes only two
State parties then the Court shall
consist of three arbitrators; one chose
from each disputing party State and
a third decided upon jointly.

OPERATION OF THE

COURT

When the dispute involves more than
two State parties then the Court will
consist of five arbitrators.

Protocol of
Olivos

The other party to the dispute may
reply to the motion for review,

Ch. 7 Art. 21

The Permanent Review Court shall
decide on the motion within 30 days.
The Court may decide to extend the
30-day term by 15 days.

REPLY TO THE
MOTION TO REVIEW

Protocol of
Olivos
Ch. 7 Art. 22
SCOPE OF THE
HOLDING

The Permanent Review Court may
confirm, modify or revoke the
holdings of the Ad Hoc Arbitration
Court.

The holding of the Permanent Review
Court shall be final and shall prevail
over the holding of the Ad Hoc
Arbitration Court.

109. Olivos Protocol, supra note 85, art. 17, 22. In addition to providing review, the
Permanent Review Court may give advisory opinions and review disputes causing

irreparable harm in exceptional cases as dictated by the CCM. Id. art. 24.
110. Id. art. 23.
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Provision
Chapter VII, Art.
23
DIRECT ACCESS TO
THE PERMANENT

REVIEW COURT

Protocol of
Olivos Chapter
VIII, Art. 28

Procedure

239

Timeline

After direct negotiations and/or CMG
resolution, the parties may expressly
agree to submit the dispute directly
and with no other recourse to the
Permanent Review Court, which
would have then the same
competence as the ad Hoc arbitral
Court. The award of the Permanent
Review Court is mandatory and final.
Any of the involved parties may
request the Clarification of the
Permanent Review Court awards,

Clarification may be requested
within the 15 days following the
award notice.

REQUEST FOR
CLARIFICATION

The Court must issue its holding
within 15 days following the
clarification request and may
grant an additional period for
compliance with the award.

Protocol of
Olivos Chapter
VIII, Art. 29

Awards must be complied with within
the period established by the
corresponding Court. In lieu of this
period, the award must be complied
with within 30 days after its
notification.

COMPLIANCE OF
PERMANENT
REVIEW COURT

AWARDS

Protocol of
Olivos Chapter
VIII Art. 30
DISCREPANCY AS
TO THE

If the State benefited from the award
considers that the measures adopted
by the other party are not in
compliance with it, it must notify the
respective Ad Hoc Arbitral Court or
Permanent Review Court.

Notification must be within 30 days
after the adoption on measures.
The respective Court must decide the
matter within 30 days from the
notification.

ENFORCEMENT OF

THE AWARD

Protocol of
Olivos Chapter
IX Art. 31
COMPENSATORY
MEASURES

If an involved State does not totally
comply with the award within one
year, the other State may implement
temporary compensatory measures
tending to attain compliance with the
award,

The award must be complied with
within one year from the day
following the period established
by the corresponding Court, or in
lieu of this period, the following
day after 30 days from the award
notification.
The State implementing the
temporary compensatory measures
must notify the other State at least
15 days before their
implementation.

Protocol of
Olivos Chapter
IX Art. 32
CHALLENGING OF
COMPENSATORY
MEASURES

The State against whom temporary
compensatory measures are
implemented may challenge them if it
considers that it satisfactorily
complied with the award

Challenge must be made within 15
DAYS after the other State notified the
temporary compensatory measures
implementation.
The corresponding Permanent Review
Court must decide the matter within
30 days after its constitution.

Because the Protocol of Olivos also addresses the Protocol of
Brasilia procedures of Ad Hoc Court arbitration and so few cases
exist, we decided to construct qualitative rather than quantitative

tables. Hence, Table VI- 08 summarizes the awards of a dispute
between Uruguay and Argentina concerning the prohibition of
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used tires and a dispute between Uruguay and Argentina concerning Argentina's omission in adopting appropriate measures to promote free trade.
TABLE VI-

Type of Dispute
Argentina
Prohibition of
the Importation
of Remolded
Tires

08 -DISPUTE, PROCEDURES, AND TIMING

Previous
Procedures
In 2004 Uruguay
requests the
commencement of
direct negotiations
with Argentina.
The MERCOSUL
Secretariat gives
notice of the
request on
December 6, 2004.

Date
Proceedings
Began

Additional
Procedures

July 26, 2005
The
Administrative
Secretariat forms
the Ad Hoc Court.

Year the Dispute
Ended
October 25, 2005
The Court extends
the period to issue
the award for 30
additional days

On February 23,
2005, after failing
to come to an
agreement,
Uruguay notifies
the MERCOSUL
Secretariat the
request for
Arbitral Procedure
under Chapter VI
of Protocol of
Olivos.
Argentina's
Failure to Adopt
Measures
Promoting Free
Trade

June 21, 2006
The
Administrative
Secretariat forms
the Ad Hoc Court.

Argentina requests
the review
procedure before
the Permanent
Review Court
challenging the
designation of the
third arbitrator.
On July 6, 2006,
the Permanent
Review Court
issued Award N'.
2/2006 holding the
request for review
inadmissible.

September 6, 2006
The Court extends
the period to issue
the award for 30
additional days

On the other hand, Table VI- 09 presents findings regarding
three disputes settled before the Permanent Review Court. Two of
the disputes in this table are the same as disputes recorded in
Table VI-08. Hence, failure to resolve a dispute in Ad Hoc Court
arbitration will receive a second opportunity for resolution in the
Permanent Review Court.
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TABLE VI- 09-CASES SETTLED BEFORE THE PERMANENT

REVIEW COURT
Type of case

Previous Procedures

Year that the case
started

Year that the dispute
ended

AWARD No 1/2005
Ad Hoc Court to decide
the review procedure
requested by Uruguay
against the Ad Hoc
Arbitral Court's Award
dated October 25, 2005
regarding the
Argentine
Prohibition of the
Importation of
Remolded Tires

On October 25, 2005
the Ad Hoc Arbitral
Court decides the case
against Uruguay.

November 9, 2005
Uruguay requests the
review proceeding

December 20, 2005
The Permanent Review
Court revokes the
October 25, 2005 award
from the Ad Hoc
Arbitral Court

AWARD No 2/2006
Court to decide the
review procedure at the
request of Argentina in
regards to the Ad Hoc
Court's decision of June
21, 2006 in the case of
Argentina's Failure
to Adopt Measures
Promoting Free
Trade between
Argentina and Uruguay

On June 21, 2006 the
Secretariat forms the
Ad Hoc Court to decide
the case of between
Argentina and
Uruguay. Argentina
challenges the
designation of the third
arbitrator requesting a
review proceeding.

June 29, 2006
Argentina requests the
review proceeding
before the Permanent
Review Court
challenging the
designation of the third
arbitrator.

July 6, 2006 the
Permanent Review
Court holds that the
request for review is
inadmissible.

AWARD No 1/2007
Court to decide whether
the compensatory
measures in the case of
the Argentine
Prohibition of the
Importation of
Remolded Tires
requires excessive
measures,

On December 20, 2005
the Permanent Review
Court repeals the Ad
Hoc Court award of
October 25, 2005 and
orders Argentina to
comply with its award,

May 3, 2007
Argentina asks the
Permanent Review
Court to determine the
proportionality of the
compensatory measures
with Uruguay.

June 8, 2007
Permanent Review
Court upholds the
compensatory
measures.

On January 13, 2006
the Court rejects a
Request for
Clarification.
On April 17, 2007
Uruguay imposes
compensatory measures
against Argentina
pointing Argentina's
failure to comply with
the award.
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Type of case

AWARD N°112008
Discrepancy regarding
compliance with Award
Nol/05 initiated by
Uruguay (Art. 30
Protocol of Olivos)"

Previous Procedures
On January 13, 2006
the Ad Hoc Court
rejects a Request for
Clarification
On April 17, 2007
Uruguay imposes
compensatory measures
against Argentina
pointing to Argentina's
failure to comply with
the award.
On June 8, 2007 the
Court upholds the
compensatory
measures.
(Award N" 1/2007)

[Vol. 42:2

Year that the case
started

Year that the dispute
ended

February 23, 2005
Uruguay notifies the
MERCOSUL
Secretariat its intention
to initiate the Arbitral
procedure.

April 25, 2008
The Permanent Review
Court decides that the
new Law 26.329 fails to
comply with the Award
N" 1/2005 and orders
its revocation or
modification.

April 25, 2008
President of the
Permanent Review
Court assembles the
Court.

Additionally, the Court
authorizes Uruguay to
maintain the
compensatory measures
until Argentina
complies with the
award.

Argentina enacts Law
N" 26.329 modifying
the MERCOSUL
conflicting law, Law N1
25.626. Uruguay
considers that this new
law fails comply with
Award N1 1/2005 and
initiates this proceeding
under Chapter VIII,
Art. 30 of the Protocol
of Olivos

The existing state of MERCOSUL prevents the regional trade
agreement from enforcing the rule of law among its Member
States. The lack of transparency, or in the instant case, lack of
publication of laws and cases, obscures the process by which
States may obtain proper relief and by which MERCOSUL may
hold States accountable for possible malfeasances. The very few
dispute resolution cases of MERCOSUL creates very little court
precedent and possibly indicates the unwillingness of Member
States to use the dispute resolution system of MERCOSUL.
Finally, MERCOSUL lacks the power to order compliance with
MERCOSUL regulations, but rather must rely on its Member
States to enforce rulings that have found their laws or measures
invalid.
Even though we require further information to determine
whether MERCOSUL Member States turn to MERCOSUL dispute resolution systems rather than to WTO dispute resolution
systems, and the trends in one direction or another, other conclusions arise from the collected data. The cases in Table VI-09 illustrate that some State laws, regulations, administrative
procedures, and company standards can and do contradict
MERCOSUL requirements. MERCOSUL requires Member
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States to publish all acts affecting trade and an annual report of
the adoption of new regulations, but the publications create a
financial burden that few States follow. 1 Additionally, while
MERCOSUL dispute bodies adhere to precedent in their legal
analysis,1 2 the lack of resolved cases and lack of information
regarding Member State regulations inhibit the transparency of
MERCOSUL and, rather than promote free trade, hinder free
trade.11 3
Without consistent MERCOSUL decisions, MERCOSUL
leaves Member States in the dark as to the manner in which
MERCOSUL courts may rule and may restrain Member States
from selecting MERCOSUL as a forum to resolve disputes. In
addition, MERCOSUL's failure to record properly the dates of
Member State actions prevents a complete analysis of the fulfillment of MERCOSUL time requirements. This includes missing
data concerning when the President of the ad hoc court obtains a
case and the dates and duration of arbitration. Without this information, analysts cannot determine whether MERCOSUL adheres
to the rule of law by fulfilling treaty time requirements.
MERCOSUL Members maintain the power to implement
temporary compensatory measures against other Member States,
however, the MERCOSUL body maintains no such power.'
Enforcement of MERCOSUL decisions thus lies directly with the
Member States.1 5 Without this individual capacity,
MERCOSUL's inability to properly enforce decisions prevents
MERCOSUL from requiring the implementation of holdings and
ultimately the rule of law. With a lack of transparency, poor
records, and week enforcement power, MERCOSUL lacks the ability to uphold the rule of law in South America.

VII.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Our was to construct an empirical data array that might portray a broader and deeper picture of trade dispute settlement
cases involving Latin American countries, with particular regard
111. Montevideo Protocol on Trade in Services of MERCOSUR art. VIII, Dec. 15,
1997, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/inter/MERCOSUIjmontv-e.asp.
112. Ljiljana Biukovic, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Regional Trade
Agreements: South American and CaribbeanModalties, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 255, 289 (2008).
113. Gabriel Gari, Regional Integration:ComparativeExperiences: Free Circulation
of Services in MERCOSUR: A Pending Task, 10 LAW & Bus. REV. Am. 545 (2004).
114. Olivos Protocol, supra note 82, art. 32
115. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 79, art. 37-40.
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to their relevance to the complex task of managing the rule of law.
We have addressed a variety of cases under the 3 dispute settlement systems described below.
Entered
Name

into force

Members

Type of dispute settlement permitted

WTO

1995

153 countries all LA and USA

Any dispute that originates from a
complaint by a Member country that
another Member has created a trade
policy or taken an action that violates a
WTO agreement

NAFTA

1994

United States,
Canada, and
Mexico

Investor-state claims; trade remedy
challenges; financial services disputes;
general disputes claiming agreement
violation

1991

Argentina,
Brasil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay

Any dispute that originates from a
complaint by a Member country that
another Member has created a trade
policy or taken an action that violates
the MERCOSUL agreement

MERCOSUL

With respect to WTO dispute settlement, our first finding was
that for cases involving a Latin American country (74, see Table
VI- 01), most (44, or 60 percent) involve the USA as respondent or
complainant (Table VI- 02). More often than not (54 of 74, or 73
percent), the USA is respondent (Table VI- 03). In addition, the
USA has been involved in more cases involving another LA Member than any single LA country (Table VI- 01). The peak year for
such cases was 2000 (13 cases) and the numbers have been
decreasing since that time, down to two cases in 2007 (Table VI02).
We also found that although Members may choose to resolve
their dispute by agreeing under DSU art. 25 to submit the matter
to binding arbitration, that process has not yet been used. Therefore, Members have requested arbitration only in the post-decision
phase of a case that was initiated in the usual manner by a
request for consultations under DSU art.4.
In respect to the type of measure challenged, we can assert
that most of the contested government actions are taxes and regular tariffs (30 of 74, or 41 percent, see Table VI- 05). Safeguard
measures were a close second at 24, about 32 percent), with the
count for AD/CVD cases being 27 percent (20 of 74). It is also
important to note that a case involving taxes and regular tariffs is
the type of case, which is less likely to be settled prior to a panel
decision than the trade remedy challenges. A notable number of
"trade remedy" cases (safeguard and AD/CVD) end with a mutu-
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ally agreed upon solution prior to panel decision (15 of 74, or 20
percent, see Table VI- 06).
Using the data we gathered from the WTO, it was possible for
us to measure the time between the request for consultations and
adoption by the DSB of the final decision of the panel or Appellate
Body. Using this information, we could conclude that the timelines prescribed by the DSU often are not met. The mean time for
these cases is 672 days (Graph IV-01), although the DSU
prescribes 468 days for this phase. On the other hand, when the
focus is on appealed cases only, we observed that all cases met the
time deadlines prescribed by the DSU (Table VI- 09).11
There can be many reasons for delays in the decisions of the
initial panel, including that most panelists do not reside in
Geneva, the place where all meetings between the panel and the
parties, and among the panelists, are held and where the panel's
appointed lawyer and economist from the Secretariat are located.
Coordinating the calendars of three busy panelists from multiple
countries with differing languages is a daunting task for the
Secretariat.
It has been the experience of the authors that trade negotiators are compelled to agree to unrealistically short deadlines for
panel decisions. In order to convince industry leaders whose companies will be most affected by panel decisions that dispute settlement under a trade agreement is an improvement on litigation or
arbitration methods otherwise available to resolve commercial
disputes, the decision process must be squeezed to an absolute
minimum. The price, however, as shown by our research, is that in
the real world, ad hoc panels cannot function under these inordinately short deadlines. We find some panels brazenly announcing
that their decision will be delayed for 3 months, 6 months, or even
116. In light of the AB's procedures, we could expect that the AB would more easily
meet its deadlines. This is because the Appellate Body's permanent structure has
permitted establishment by its Secretariat of a rigorous procedure in which its legal
division assigns an attorney to a challenge from the time a Member files a request for
establishment of a panel. This attorney tracks the case through its stages of written
and oral submissions, the panel's preliminary report to the parties, and the panel's
final report. In other words, by the time a party appeals, the AB already has outlined
an approach to the panel's report that will then be reviewed and decided by the three
AB members appointed to the appeal. Interview with Debra Steger, Former Chief
Legal Advisor to the Appellate Body (Feb. 12, 2001). Initial panels, on the other
hand, are ad hoc entities with a varied composition that may not even include a
lawyer (the USA insists that at least one lawyer be chosen for any panel in which it is
a primary party). While many officials in the WTO Mission or in the capitals of the
Members are reappointed to multiple panels over time, this familiarity with the
process has not apparently improved panel efficiency.
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longer." 7
No procedure in the DSU permits this kind of self-award of
additional time, but the parties and the WTO Secretariat accept
such delay as a necessary part of the process. They look the other
way, in other words, to recurring violations of treaty deadlines.
We recognize that panels are well justified in utilizing such
extreme measures. The complexity of cases is rising in a non-linear curve as the Appellate Body settles the interpretation of provision after provision in the WTO Agreements, leaving only the
more difficult aspects of WTO treaty language for panels to
engage. Moreover, given the lack of consultation time after the
panel is formed, parties sometimes initiate delays by the panel to
provide breathing space to explore settlement possibilities.
Should we be surprised, then, when losing respondents treat
the DSU requirements for implementation of panel and AB decisions as mere guidelines instead of international obligations?"'
Should we be surprised when we see the most developed WTO
Members simply ignoring a challenge altogether, that is, not even
conceding the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system
over a measure inarguably within WTO purview? 19 Should we be
surprised when losing Members delay implementation of panel
findings of violation for years? 2 °
117. Most recently, the WTO panel considering US allegations that European
subsidies to Airbus violate the WTO Subsidies Agreement summarily announced in
December that its report would be delayed for six months until June 2010. Pilita
Clark, Airbus Fears Delay to Boeing Report, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 20, 2009), http:/l
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8e491306-edaa-1lde-bal2-OO144feab49a.html?catid=46&
SID=google.
118. Ten years after the EU Member States refused to approve importation from
the USA and Canada of meat treated with growth hormones, a position found
contrary to WTO rules in Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS4848/AB/R
(Jan. 16, 1998). The USA and Canada still are imposing financial retaliation against
EU imports.
119. In response to the EU's challenge to USA legislation that imposed a secondary
boycott on companies related to Cuban companies that benefited from nationalization
of the property of USA citizens, the USA announced that it "would not show up" for
proceedings because its expanded embargo affected its essential national security,
which it claimed were exempt from WTO purview under Article XXI of the GATT.See
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United
States-The Cuban Liberty and Demoncratic Solidarity Act, WTfDS38/2 (Oct. 4,
1996); Alan S. Alexandroff & Rajeev Sharma, The National Security Provision: GATT

Article XXI, in

THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

ANALYsis 1577 (Patrick F.J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005).
120. In response to the Appellate Body's finding that distributing anti-dumping
duties collected at the border to USA companies harmed by the dumping violated the
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, the USA Congress repealed the legislation in 2006.
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Based on our findings, we could predict that access by LA
countries to WTO dispute settlement procedures against alleged
violations by the USA will continue to decrease. Armed with an
expert staff of trade lawyers in several agencies, 2 ' the USA is both
a formidable opponent and a reluctant loser. Even in cases in
which the LA country scores an enormously important victory,
such as the change in Members' understanding of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture represented by the US-Cotton Subsidies decision, 2 2 USA compliance has been so slow and begrudging that
even a large country such as the complainant here, Brazil, must
question whether the massive outlays of attorneys' and other
experts' fees have been justified. 1 23 Perhaps this is unjustifiably
flippant, but the Cotton case showed, on one hand, that David can
indeed slay Goliath and, on the other, that Goliath seems to have
as many lives as a cat.
As to NAFTA Chapter 19 disputes, the most striking data are
contained in Table V-04. Not only has no case involving Mexico
Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment), WT/DS217/234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003). However, transitional
provisions have resulted in payouts continuing to this day. See Peter Morton, Byrd
Amendment Finally Bites the Dust, NATIONAL POST (Oct. 1, 2007), http:ll
network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fpposted/archive/2007/10/01/byrd-amendmentfinally-bites-the-dust.aspx. The tax breaks given by the USA to exports dates to the
1980s as a means to equalize tax rebates given by the EU to its exports. Several
challenges by the EU to serially-amended USA legislation culminated in a $4 billion
win by the EU in the 2002 case of United States-Tax Treatment for "ForeignSales
Corporations." Appellate Body Report, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations." WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002); see Tim Josling, WTO
Dispute Settlement and the EU-US Mini Trade Wars: A Commentary of Fritz Breuss,
4 J. OF INDUSTRY, COMPETITION AND TRADE, BANK PAPERS 337, 342-43 (2004).
121. USA Department of Commerce attorneys from the Office of Chief Counsel for
Import Administration litigate AD/CVD cases in the WTO and in regional trade
agreement dispute settlement systems (notably, NAFTA chapter 19) and assist
Department of Justice attorneys in AD/CVD suits filed in the USA federal courts.
Attorneys from the Office of General Counsel of the USA's International Trade
Commission conduct the USA case when the injury determination of an AD/CVD case
is challenged, and also litigate safeguard measures in USA courts.
122. Panel Report, United States-Subsidieson Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept.
8, 2004).
123. After 3 years of informal negotiations and WTO maneuvering with the USA to
obtain compliance with the decisions of the panel and the Appellate Body that had
been adopted by the DSB in March 2005, Brazil finally triggered establishment of an
arbitration panel to approve Brazil's proposed financial retaliation against other USA
exports to Brazil, a challenge in which Brazil in large part prevailed. Panel Report,
United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Brazil, WT/DS267/RW (Dec. 18, 2007), affd in part, Appellate Body Report, United
States- Subsidies on Upland Cotton: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil,
WT/DS267/AB/RW (Jun. 2, 2008). The battle of the arbitrators continues.
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and the USA met the treaty deadline of 315 days (far from it, the
mean being 1,282 days), but nearly as much time is absorbed in
remand proceedings after the panel's final decision is issued (279
days on average) as the treaty anticipates for the entire dispute
settlement process. Strictly from a rule of law perspective, taking
an average of two and one-half years longer than required by a
binding international treaty, whatever the reason, shows an
astounding with basic due process entitlements. While complying
with deadlines, as compared with the panel's reaching well reasoned decisions, may seem of a lesser priority, we would posit that
much else that has gone awry in the NAFTA Chapter 19 process is
explicable from this revealing start.
As with the WTO data, delaying justice to the parties seems
not to trouble the NAFTA Parties, as none has been heard to complain or to promise tighter enforcement of the treaty obligations.
We cannot confidently draw conclusions about MERSOCUL dispute resolution because of the difficulty in teasing data out of the
scarce resources available. However, Table VI-06 suggests a vigorous process that averages but 141 days from start to finish, with
AD/CVD and tariff cases taking far less time (75 and 101 days,
respectively), with the substantial extra time for safeguards cases
(240 days) expanding the mean.
VIII.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING CIVIL SOCIETY

Legislation in LA countries in the midst of this swirl of dispute panel jurisprudence has been far more supportive of the rule
of law than the record of ignored treaty deadlines would predict.
We identified recent laws in nine LA countries that require transparency and accountability in government rulemaking.
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Country

Law and year enacted

Argentina

Decree 1172 of December 4, 2003, Access to Public Information; Law of
Fiscal Responsibility, Law 24156 of Financial Administration and Systems
of Public National Sector Control; and Decree of Regulation of Public
Offering Transparency No. 677 of 2001124

Brazil

Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF), of May 2000125
Law of Transparency No. 20.285, enacted on August 11, 2008126

Chile
Honduras

Decree No.on170-2006
of Transparency
and Access to Public Information,
30, 2006 121
December
published

Mexico

Federal Law of Transparency
and Access to Governmental Public
Information, published on June 11, 2002 128

Nicaragua

Law No. 662 of Transparency
for Nicaraguan Governmental Entities and
Companies, enacted on June 24, 2008 129

Panama

Law No. 6 of January 22 of 2002, providing
for transparency in
1
regulations in public management 0

Peru

Law N' 27806 of Transparency and Access to Public Information, enacted
on August 2, 2002'13

Uruguay

Law No. 18.381 of Access to Public Information, published on November
7, 2008132

These laws, dating from 2002 to 2008 (most in the latter two
years), and thus coincident with the reported decisions, make
explicit what Professor Powell argued was an incidental impact of
regional trade agreements and their dispute settlement systems.'33 The early Mexican law has the broadest reach' and Brazil's opens only banking transactions, but each works toward
managing the rule of law by requiring transparency, accountabil124. Acerca del Gobierno, Argentina (April 9, 2011), http://www.argentina.gov.ar/
argentina/portal/paginas.dhtml?pagina=308.
125. H6lio Tollini, Social Control and Transparency in Brazil, Indice de
Transparencia (April 9, 2011), http://www.indicedetransparencia.org.br/?.p=857.
126. Law of TransparencyNo. 20.285, Library of Congress of Chile (April 9, 2011),
http://www.bcn.cl/ley-transparencia.
127. Decree No. 170-2006 of Transparency and Access to Public Information,
ONCAE HonduCompras (April 9, 2011), http://www.honducompras.gob.hn/Info/
LeyTransparencia.aspx.
128. Federal Law of Transparencyand Access to Governmental Public Information
(April 9, 2011), http://www.fincionpublica.gob.mx/leyes/leyinfo/ley-lftaipg2002.htm.
129. Law No. 662 of Transparency for Nicaraguan Governmental Entities and
Companies (April 9, 2011), http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/Normaweb.nsf/($All)/C3
4AD5893B7AFF9E06257508005C5EB6?OpenDocument.
130. http://www.setransparencia.gob.pa/documentos/Ley-6_Transparencia.pdf.
131. Law No. 27806 of Transparency and Access to Public Information (2002),
http://www. transparencia. org. pe/documentos/ley_ 27086. -ley-de _transp. acceso_
informacion-publica.pdf.
132. http://www.redipd.orgldocumentacionlegislacion/uruguay-iden-idphp.php.
133. See Powell, supra note 3, at 97.
134. Eric Heyer, Latin American State Secrecy and Mexico's TransparencyLaw, 38
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 437, 439 (2006).
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ity, and due process by governments. These laws make obligatory
what before were the unwritten and indirect effects of implementation of the agreements themselves. They promote timeliness,
inclusive record keeping, and impartiality in the administrative
decisional process of rulemaking, improvements that, taken with
transparency and accountability, are key elements of democratic
governance and, in turn, the rule of law. As the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights put it:
[F]reedom of Expression is a cornerstone upon which the very
existence of a democratic society rests. It is indispensable for the
formation of public opinion. It is also a conditio sine qua non for
the development of political parties, trade unions, scientific and
cultural societies and, in general, those who wish to influence the
public. It represents, in short, the means that enable the community, when exercising its options, to be sufficiently informed. Consequently, it can be said that a society that is not well informed is
not a society that is truly free.135
We find these results even more compelling in verifying our
hypothesis in light of the fact that the studied challenges, after all,
are about technical trading measures, not matters of constitutional court importance, such as an effort by an authoritarian
ruler to extend the term of the presidency. For example, concerning Argentina's success in overturning Brazil's ban on importation
of used tires,'3 6 Brazil simply repealed the measure banning
retreaded tires. While this step alone will not likely affect many
people or companies not engaged in producing or distributing
retreaded tires, except perhaps in the cost of such tires in the marketplace, Brazil's further legislation in support of open governance
will indeed have broader impact on its civil society.
We would also point to multiple root causes for these new
laws, including increased participation in the global market on all
levels. Nonetheless, from the nature of the disputes studied and
of the laws enacted to open governmental regulatory processes, we
are confident that trade dispute settlement systems were an
important underpinning for their passage. These transparency
laws are part of what we have styled "managing the rule of law,"
by which we refer to the arduous process of strengthening the
135. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice
of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory
Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, 70 (Nov. 13,1985).
136. Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports Of Retreaded
Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
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infrastructure of democratic governance to withstand any threat
to its continuance.
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Comment
Zachary D. Kaufman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Thank you to Shawn, Nanci, and the rest of the Editorial
Board of the Inter-American Law Review for hosting this important conference that highlights a crucial and timely topic, "The
Impact of Regional Trade Agreements on Human Rights and the
Rule of Law." It is an honor to speak here today along with my
distinguished co-panelists, Dean Claudio Grossman, Professor
Stephen Powell, and Patricia Camino, and our moderator, Harout
Samra.
The article by Professor Powell and Dr. Ludmila Mendonga
Lopes Ribeiro, "Managing the Rule of Law in the Americas," provides a comprehensive and valuable background to global (GATT
and WTO) and regional (NAFTA and MERCOSUL/MERCOSUR)
trade regimes concerning North and South America. The authors
help demystify these institutions by describing their histories,
compositions, structures, and procedures. The article also
presents and then examines a clear hypothesis: "trade dispute settlement contributes to management and perfection of the rule of
law in support of democratic governance for civil societies in Latin
America."'
Much of the article focuses on data analysis, such as the number of cases before a dispute settlement system and their parties,
issues, winners, losers, and timelines. This in itself is a significant
contribution. But it left me eager for even more examination and
explanation of that data. I would thus like to spend my limited
time proposing a future research agenda using this article as a
starting point.
* University of Oxford, DPhil (PhD) in International Relations expected 2012;
Yale Law School, J.D. 2009; University of Oxford, MPhil in International Relations
2004; Yale University, B.A. in Political Science 2000. The author is currently a
Professorial Lecturer at George Washington University's Elliott School of
International Affairs. From 2009-10, the author served as a law clerk to the
Honorable Juan R. Torruella on the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit. The author welcomes responses at zachary.kaufman@aya.yale.edu.
1. Stephen Powell & Ludmila Mendonga Lopes Ribeiro, Managing the Rule of
Law in the Americas: An Empirical Portrait of the Effects of 15 Years of WTO,
MERCOSUL, and NAFTA Dispute Resolution on Civil Society in Latin America, 42
INTER-AM. L. REv. 2, 197 (2011).
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II. FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
Avenues for future research include the following topics: further primary research, causation versus correlation, identities of
parties and panelists, regions beyond the Americas, politicallymotivated cases, institutional proliferation, and a policy proposal
concerning "extraordinary delays" in bi-national panels. I consider each in turn. These avenues of research involve trade, comparative area studies, U.S. foreign policy, and multilateralism.
A.

FurtherPrimary Research

In some cases, Professor Powell and Dr. Ribeiro proffer wellinformed theories for various phenomena based on available data.
For example, the authors observe a relatively high rate of settlement prior to the issuance of a WTO panel decision. The authors
then postulate that the reasons for this trend include a combination of a desire to avoid potentially adverse holdings, a lack of confidence in the quality of dispute resolution, and political
motivations.2 Future research, through interviewing the parties
themselves and analyzing the relevant countries' internal documents, should be undertaken to support or refute those theories,
and to uncover other-and perhaps the real-reasons for such
settlement.
B. Causation Versus Correlation
Professor Powell and Dr. Ribeiro argue that there is issue
linkage between the rule of law by which Latin American countries operate at home and abroad. Specifically, the authors contend that participation in regional trade agreements and their
dispute settlement systems have, in part, caused greater rule of
law in the home country? While it is true that a high degree of
2. Id. at 210-211.
3. Professor Powell and Dr. Ribeiro argue that there is "an incidental impact of
regional trade agreements and their dispute settlement systems." Id. at 249. The
authors go on to observe:
Recent laws in nine [Latin American] countries . . . work[]

toward[ I managing the rule of law by requiring transparency,
accountability, and due process by governments[.] [T]hese laws
make obligatory what before were the unwritten and indirect
effects of implementation of the agreements themselves. They
promote timeliness, inclusive record keeping, and impartiality in
the administrative decisional process of rulemaking, improvements
that, taken with transparency and accountability, are key elements
of democratic governance and, in turn, the rule of law.
Id. at 250.
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correlation exists between these two phenomena, future research
could explore whether the causality indeed runs in the direction
the authors theorize. We might find, instead, that improvements
in the rule of law domestically over the past two decades in several Latin American countries have contributed to-and perhaps
themselves even caused-these countries' greater participation in
regional trade agreements and their dispute settlement systems.4
Alternatively, we might find that rule of law domestically and
abroad are mutually reinforcing and have bolstered one another
over time and issue area, or that the rule of law in each case is
strengthened by some third factor, such as economic development.
Whatever the case, the authors should also account for the fact
that, in some parts of Latin America, observance of the rule of law
domestically may have decreased, not increased.'
C. Identities of Partiesand Panelists
As much as Professor Powell and Dr. Ribeiro state that the
identity of the parties before the WTO can help predict the nature
of a dispute settlement case, 6 can the identities of panelists on the
Appellate Body help predict the outcome of the case?7 After all, the
composition of, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court, shifts over
time, becoming more liberal or conservative on particular issues,
and thus impacting the outcome of cases before the Court.' Presumably, the WTO's Appellate Body also shifts its politics-and
corresponding decision-making-depending on its changing composition over time. However, unlike members of the U.S. Supreme
Court, all of whom are American, members of the WTO's Appellate Body are of various nationalities, complicating their personal,
4. On recent developments in the rule of law in Latin America, see, e.g., LINN
HAMMERGREN,

ENVISIONING REFORM:

IMPROVING

JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

IN LATIN

AMERICA (2007); RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF

JUDICIAL REFORM (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001).
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN
LATIN AMERICA: DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE OF LAW (2000).

6. Powell & Ribeiro, supra note 1, at 211 ("[Klnowing only the countries involved
has predictive value as to the type of measure likely to be under review.").
7. In their description of the WTO dispute resolution system, the authors note

that the WTO's Appellate Body, which is composed of seven permanent members
serving four-year terms, breaks into panels of three members to hear appeals. Id. at
220. This is similar to U.S. circuit courts, in which the larger body breaks into threemember panels to hear appeals, but dissimilar to the U.S. Supreme Court, on which
all nine permanent members serving life terms hear appeals, except in certain limited
situations.
8. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, Competing Models of JudicialCoalition Formationand
Case Outcome Determination, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 411 (2009).
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predictive politics.9 Is it also possible that, as in the U.S. court
system, ° knowing the identity of the members of the precise panel
of the WTO's Appellate Body they would come before could be a
factor in driving parties to settle their disputes before advancing
to a panel hearing?

D.

Regions Beyond the Americas

The article, by design, focuses on the Americas. 1 Future
research should consider cases of other regions. Are the linkages
that exist in the Americas between trade and the rule of law the
same as elsewhere in the world? Why or why not?
Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, has (1) relatively higher
levels of corruption, (2) relatively weaker levels of the rule of law
domestically and regionally, and (3) relatively weaker but in some
cases older regional trade agreements and dispute resolution systems, such as the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS).12 How do these and other political, economic, social,
9. The seven current members of the WTO's Appellate Body are nationals of
Belgium, China, Japan, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, and the United States.
See World Trade Org., WTO Dispute Settlement-Appellate Body Members, http:ll
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/ab members..descrp-e.htm (last visited Sept.
10, 2011). Past members of the WTO's Appellate Body have been nationals of
Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines,
the United States, and Uruguay. Id.
10. See, e.g., Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel Announcement, Settlement, and
Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 55, 55-58 (2007) (noting that, in order to address "a
well-publicized caseload crisis," some U.S. federal appellate courts have experimented
with, inter alia, announcing the composition of appellate panels well in advance of
oral argument, under the theory that the litigants' assumption-correct or not-that
panel composition permitted prediction of the outcome "might lead some parties to
settle their claims to avoid certain panels"); Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and
Settlement in the FederalAppellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on
Ideologically Divided Courts, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685, 686 (2000) (noting that "[o]ne of
the reasons for the D.C. Circuit's adoption of its practice [of announcing the
composition of its panels before the parties have prepared and filed their briefs] in
1986 was its belief that, because litigants perceived the court as ideologically divided,
the early announcement of the composition of the panel would increase the settlement
rate and reduce the adjudicatory burden on the court"); R. Polk Wagner & Lee
Petherbridge, Is the Federal CircuitSucceeding? An EmpiricalAssessment of Judicial
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1174 (2004) (arguing that allowing "parties to
know panel membership months in advance would increase both the time and the
cost-incentives to settle the appeal").
11. The article acknowledges that the authors' theses were tested within the
context of a particular region and a single set of trade agreements. Powell & Ribeiro,
supra note 1, at 200.
12. In comparison to the WTO, NAFTA, and MERCOSUL/MERCOSUR, which all
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cultural, and historical factors contribute to disparate relationships and outcomes between trade and the rule of law?
E.

Politically-Motivated Cases

Professor Powell and Dr. Ribeiro note that countries sometimes bring complaints before the WTO for purely political purposes. 3 The authors' observation concerns issue areas beyond
trade. Indeed, one of the primary reasons the United States has
not joined a different, but parallel international regime, the International Criminal Court (ICC), is out of fear that politically-motivated cases might be brought against the United States and its
allies. 4 Advocates of greater multilateralism in world affairs may
want to consider proposing reforms to the WTO dispute resolution
process that would penalize or otherwise inhibit purely political
complaints. If such complaints continue, one risk is that some
countries will be reticent to use the WTO. Additionally, critics of,
for example, the ICC will garner more ammunition in their battle
against the court by pointing to the WTO as a similarly global
forum in which politicized cases are brought.
F.

Institutional Proliferation

The authors document multiple trade agreements in the
Americas and a preference among some Latin American countries
for using regional trade dispute settlement systems over a global
one. 5 Taken to its logical extreme, what are the implications of
the continued proliferation of regional trade dispute systems (that
make rules and set precedents) around the world? Can such
proliferation (instead of focusing on the more global WTO) lead to
became operational in the 1990s, SADC, COMESA, and ECOWAS can trace their
roots to the 1970s and 1980s.
13. Powell & Ribeiro, supra note 1, at 209 ("[A] certain number of requests for
[WTO] consultation [which is akin to a complaint] will have been filed only for
political effect. For example, a [WTO] Member may need to placate a domestic
industry bedeviled by imports or the Member may be placing a marker for on-going or
future negotiations.").
14. Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. Dep't of State Legal Adviser & Stephen J. Rapp, U.S.
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Special Briefing on U.S. Engagement
with the International Criminal Court and the Outcome of the Recently Concluded
Review Conference (June 14, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/wci/us releases/remarks!
143178.htm (Koh stated: "We've had a concern in the past that the prosecutor of the
ICC could make-could undertake politically motivated prosecutions, could perhaps
come after Americans who were engaged in protecting people from atrocity instead of
emphasizing those that were committing the crimes.").
15. Powell & Ribeiro, supra note 1, at 198 (observing "the trend toward increased
litigation before regional trade panels rather than the WTO").
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the inconsistent development of certain rules, practices, and international law, and perhaps other inefficiencies, as is feared with
the proliferation of ad hoc war crimes tribunals (instead of focusing on the more global ICC)?16 If so, how can this potential problem be managed through formal institutional designs and
modifications and/or informal behavioral solutions?
G.

Policy Proposal Concerning "ExtraordinaryDelays"
in BinationalPanels

I would like to end with a policy proposal based on the article.
Most of the factors Professor Powell and Dr. Ribeiro identify for
the "extraordinary delays" in Binational NAFTA panel litigation
concern the appointment of panelists, whether the legitimate or
politicized delay in identifying candidates, or conflicts of interest
that arise once candidates are selected. 7 In order to begin to
address these problems, might one remedial measure be to reconsider the selection process for panelists? Instead of having panelists chosen ad hoc for each request for panel review, could
panelists be assigned for multi-year terms, much like members of
the WTO's Appellate Body? i" Moreover, NAFTA could maintain a
roster of alternate or substitute panelists who could fill in for
those panelists whenever a conflict of interest is identified. These
proposals, which share some commonalities with the method by
which MERCOSUL/MERCOSUR member states maintain a list of
arbitrators to constitute an Ad Hoc Court, 9 could speed litigation,
further professionalize the NAFTA trade dispute resolution system, and reduce start-up costs that currently occur each time new
panelists need to be chosen.
Once again, I thank you for the privilege of joining my distinguished co-panelists and moderator here today.

16. See Zachary D. Kaufman, The Future of TransitionalJustice, 1 ST. ANTONY'S
REV. 58, 73 (2005) ("There currently exist several war crimes tribunals ... and
...it is possible that despite the advent of the ICC, more will be established. The
simultaneous operation of multiple, unconnected international, hybrid, and domestic
war crimes tribunals may lead to the development of conflicting international
criminal law.").
17. Powell & Ribeiro, supra note 1, at 226.
18. Id. at 203.
19. Id. at 228.
INT'L
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QUESTION-AND-ANSWER
Question:
In the United States, we have recently seen the success of
coalitions of workers in obtaining increases in wages by leveraging
the public relations policies of large corporations such as Whole
Foods and Taco Bell. Do you think it is possible to promote
human rights and protect workers by continuing to leverage the
image and branding of international corporations?

Professor Kaufman:
Thank you for raising this issue. Corporate Social Responsibility is self-consciously a relatively new field, 20 but one that
should concern us all.
There have certainly been campaigns through which the public-often a coalition of social, political, student, worker, and religious groups-has successfully applied pressure to a multi-national
corporation to improve its human rights policies. For example,
members of the apparel and footwear industries, such as Nike and
the Gap, changed some of their policies in the 1990s after a public
outcry over their practice of employing child laborers and maintaining "sweatshop" conditions in their overseas factories.2 '
One situation in which such civil society initiatives can be
complicated is when goods produced and sold lawfully are subsequently used for nefarious purposes. For example, immediately
before the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Hutu-led government
imported an enormous number of machetes from China.22
20. See, e.g.,

THE

OXFORD

HANDBOOK

OF

CORPORATE

SOCIAL

RESPONSIBILITY

(Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008).
21. John H. Cushman Jr., Nike Pledges to End Child Labor and Apply U.S. Rules
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1998, at Dl; Steven Greenhouse, Anti-Sweatshop
Movement is Achieving Gains Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000, at Al.
22.

ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

127 (1999) ("Requests for import licenses from January 1993 through March 1994
show that 581,000 kilograms of machetes were imported into Rwanda .... Assuming
the average weight of a machete to be one kilogram, this quantity would equal some
581,000 machetes or one for every third adult Hutu male in Rwanda."); LINDA
MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 56 (2004) ("It was during
1993... that a project began to import into Rwanda a huge number of machetes and
other agricultural tools ....
These tools came into the country under government
import licenses headed 'eligible imports'. The overwhelming majority of the tools
were imported from China. As an illustration of the sheer volume involved, the total
number of machetes imported in 1993 weighed 581.175 kilos and cost US$725.669:
there was an estimated one new machete for ever third male in the country."); Mark
Doyle, Ex-Rwandan PMReveals Genocide Planning,BBC NEWS, Mar. 26, 2004, http://
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Machetes are, of course, a legitimate and widely used agricultural
tool, including throughout Rwanda and the rest of sub-Saharan
Africa. However, machetes can also be used to slaughter people.
Indeed, the stockpiling of machetes in Rwanda was a significant
portion of the planning and preparation for-and perpetration
of-the genocide. The question here is: To what extent should a
manufacturer be aware of and responsible for the way in which its
goods are not only produced, but also ultimately used? In this
case, does China bear any responsibility for the fact that its
machetes were used to massacre almost a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu in 1994? And, if so, how can and should China be held
accountable?
Another complication of such civil society initiatives is that
some corporations and governments may be less susceptible-or
even immune-to campaigns to publicly "name and shame" them
for their policies and practices. A downside of globalization and
free trade is thus that markets can be flooded with goods and services that are exploitative, discriminatory, or otherwise harmful
in any number of ways. Concerned governments, inter-governmental agencies, watchdog groups, and the general public must be
ever vigilant in monitoring such conduct and devising more effective strategies to identify and inhibit it.

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3572887.stm ("[I]n 1993 the government of Rwanda
imported, from China, three quarters of a million dollars worth of machetes. This was
enough for one new machete for every third male.").

Comment
Dean Claudio Grossman*
First of all, thank you for the generous introduction. I am
honored to be here. It bodes well for the future of the legal profession to have students like you, who, in spite of the costs of legal
education and the pressures of being a law student, make space to
organize events that address key issues of our time. I salute your
initiative and efforts. I am also honored to be in the company of
such a distinguished group of professionals, and to have the opportunity to comment on some of the topics raised by the excellent
contribution of Professor Powell.
Professor Powell's contribution opens up a dialogue between
two communities that previously were largely separated (i.e.,
human rights and trade), or perhaps between three communities
if environmentalists are included. In my law school, I have
spearheaded the initiative to create integrated sections in the first
year of study. Reality does not present itself as cleanly and clearly
as issues are presented in first-year courses such as civil procedure or torts. More often than not, reality more closely resembles
a confused mass of data. Accordingly, some of us believe that it is
important to develop an educational environment that allows students to capture the interconnectedness of different legal subjects,
while at the same time understanding their theoretical underpinnings in a historical context. Needless to say, this is not an easy
task, as it is not simple to break down artificial barriers that
divide intellectual communities. Professor Powell's contribution
* Claudio Grossman, dean of American University Washington College of Law
and the Raymond I. Geraldson Scholar for International and Humanitarian Law, is
an expert on international law, human rights, and Inter-American affairs. Grossman
was unanimously elected chair of the United Nations Committee against Torture in
April 2008, where he has been a member since 2003 and previously served as vice
chair (2003-2008). He is also a member of the Commission for the Control of Interpol's
Files. Grossman served as president of the College of the Americas, an organization of
colleges and universities in the Western Hemisphere, from November 2003-November
2007. Previously, he was a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights from 1993-2001, where he served in numerous capacities including twice as its
President (1996 and 2001) as well as the special rapporteur on the rights of
indigenous populations and the special rapporteur on women's rights. He has
participated in numerous on-site visits and election-observing missions in Eastern
Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. He has also worked on international
legal issues with the United Nations and the International Human Rights Law Group
(now known as Global Rights).
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shows that trade is not only about trade, and human rights are
not only about human rights, as those concepts are classically
understood. Just recognizing this reality opens up opportunities
for important dialogue.
My contributions to this panel are grounded in perspectives
gained through my experiences on the United Nations Committee
against Torture and, in particular, in this hemisphere as a former
member and President of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights.
In my opinion, we can identify three stages in the recent
evolution of human rights in this hemisphere. Allow me to state,
ab initio, that rather than three separate and sequential stages,
these periods share overlapping elements and, in some instances,
countries experience a predominance of certain aspects over
others.
The first stage leading up to the 1970s was characterized by
the presence of dictatorships or authoritarian regimes in virtually
every country. These regimes pursued state policies of mass and
gross violations of human rights. In that initial stage, the InterAmerican system for the protection of human rights, i.e., the
norms and institutions developed under the aegis of the Organization of American States (OAS), had primarily one goal, which was
to expose and denounce those regimes, largely through the mechanism of country reports. In that context, it was not feasible for
democratic societies to conclude free trade agreements with such
regimes. This dynamic demonstrates the connection existing
between human rights and democracy, on the one hand, and trade
on the other. It also underscores Professor Kauffman's earlier
point about the link between internal and external elements that
makes it possible for the negotiation and conclusion of free trade
agreements. It would not be possible to have legitimate interactions, like those described by Professor Kauffman, with a dictator.
During this first stage, the Inter-American system was, for example, denouncing the state practice of disappearances. The system's purpose was to expose this practice and create political
conditions that would stop its occurrence and, at the same time,
delegitimize its perpetrators.
The second phase, generally taking place during the 1980s, is
characterized by the process of democratic transitions with elected
governments. During this phase, for the Inter-American system,
it was crucial to fight the legacy left behind by dictatorships and
authoritarian governments. In this phase, the fight against impu-
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nity was central to allow societies to address the mass and gross
violations of human rights that had taken place, securing truth
and justice for the victims and the population at large as well as
holding the perpetrators accountable. Together with the fight
against impunity, the Inter-American system also contributed
through its petition system to the long process of building independent judiciaries, respect for freedom of expression and other
hallmarks of democratic governance. The petition system allows
individuals to bring their grievances before the Inter-American
organs if the petitioners did not find satisfaction in the domestic
setting. Free trade agreements, as Professor Powell stated, can
contribute to processes of democratic transition and the strengthening of the rule of law because such agreements require
increased transparency in administration and decision-making,
and often provide opportunities to accede to international organs
whose intervention could be triggered by individual actors.
The third phase, in which numerous countries of the region
find themselves today, is characterized by the realization that
democracy goes far beyond free elections. Democracy includes,
among other important components, institutions and values, independent judiciaries, and a representative Congress that truly
exercises its supervisory functions in a context of separation of
powers. As importantly, democracy requires a vibrant and strong
civil society where everyone counts. From that perspective, the
struggle against poverty and discrimination of any kind, together
with an environment of citizen security within the rule of law and
the existence of real equal opportunities for all, becomes central.
Free trade agreements can contribute to democratic development
with, for example, provisions strengthening labor rights that
include techniques such as collective bargaining. Programmatic
norms or statements of principles can also provide opportunities
for societal actors to press for the implementation of such norms.
Along this line of reasoning, even if the provisions do not
include clearly-defined obligations or mechanisms of supervision,
they can still potentially be used in societal debates. There is an
additional value to the inclusion of labor and environmental provisions in free trade agreements even if they are only programmatic.
They signal a progressive development challenging the notion
that trade is only about trade narrowly construed. Numerous factors, indeed, impact trade, and legitimate claims could be made to
include such topics in discussions regarding free trade agreements. One example is citizen security. Unlimited flow of illegal
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weapons of different kinds could destabilize a developing society,
creating an environment of generalized insecurity with multiple
negative consequences including increased crimes and violence
and a deterioration of the rule of law. This has obviously negative
implications on economic development and trade, as well. As environmental and labor issues have been incorporated in trade agreements, space has been created to argue that topics such as citizen
security, could also be considered in discussions surrounding such
agreements. Unlimited expansion of topics, however, poses
problems to the extent that such expansion could, due to the complexities of issues involved, render it increasingly difficult to conclude a free trade agreement.
Bearing this in mind, it is important to act reasonably in identifying the impact of new trade topics. The point here is that such
a discussion is valid, and the development of criteria and principles in this area is legitimate. Perhaps a key factor here would be
the impact that the free trade agreement would have in the lives
of all inhabitants of a country. From this perspective, for example, using free trade agreements to persuade countries to forego
protections under the international trade regime that had allowed
them in crisis situations to access generic medicines, is arguably
not in accordance with the purpose and principles of human rights
law. This is particularly so when a developing country with weak
institutional structures waives its rights under the international
trade regime in an attempt to acquire legitimacy by becoming a
partner to a free trade agreement.
To contribute to limiting or reducing the possibilities for such
abuse, greater transparency and participation of different societal
actors are required. In this context, the expertise and knowledge
of non-governmental organizations that engage in transnational
actions are very valuable.
Let me conclude my introductory comments by reiterating my
opinion that there is a place for labor, environmental and other
matters relevant to trade in free trade agreements. In today's
interconnected world, links between regimes that were previously
viewed as distinctly separate, e.g., trade and human rights, are no
longer perceived as such. Needless to say, bringing together these
fields raises serious difficulties and complexities. For some of us,
however, those challenges are not insurmountable obstacles.
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Thank you. I'm also very honored to be in front of these very
intelligent and very experienced scholars. I think I'm going to add
onto what Prof. Grossman has said. As everyone here has stated
again and again, the link between trade and human rights is
undeniable at this point. The recent increase and proliferation of
Regional Trade Agreements has opened the door for an avenue to
better integrate human rights and trade. Prof. Grossman was just
saying that one of the important things that we should consider
with regards to integrating human rights into trade agreements,
is the strength of the participant. However, I also think it is
important to take into consideration the type of human rights
being evaluated: whether we are considering labor rights, environmental rights or indigenous rights. As with the participant, it can
also be stated that there are different levels of strength among the
different types of human rights. This also ties into what Prof.
Rosen was saying in the beginning about the two different categories of human rights: the hardcore and softcore human rights. Let
me explain. For example, when parties discuss the integration of
labor rights, they are able to consider as a basis and as a parameter, the general core labor rights already established by the ILO
convention.
However, in the environmental arena, as Prof. Powell questioned: "what are the core environmental rights?" There are no
real core environmental rights established by 6ny international
organization. Part of the reason is that, Environmental protection, in contrast with labor rights, is a little bit more difficult to
standardize. Moreover, in comparison with labor rights, the
important environmental standards will differ with the issues of
each country. I believe that this makes environmental protection
a little bit more difficult to enforce. However, this contrast is
what makes environmental protection a human right that is better suited to be addressed by regional trade agreements rather
* Ms. Camino earned her law degree at the University of Florida where she
served as a competition member and President of the Philip C. Jessup Moot Court
Team. As a competition member, Ms. Camino received the award for Fourth Best
Overall Memorial in the Philip C. Jessup Southeastern Super Regional Moot Court
Competition. Ms. Camino is currently an Associate at the law firm of Koch
Parafinczuk & Wolf.
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than the multilateral forum. In a regional trade agreement, environmental protection can be tailored to the issues of that country.
It is especially true with those agreements that are actually
regional in the sense that they are closer to each other - because
these geographically close countries will have similar cultural
issues, similar environmental issues, and similar ecosystems.
Thus, there is a higher probability that they are going to reach
some sort of consensus and that the actual human rights provisions in these agreements will have more practical significance.
To conclude, the ability of a regional trade agreement to provide a
better forum for human rights enforcement might differ with the
type of human rights being considered.
Nevertheless, in a general sense, I believe that RTAs do provide a better and more efficient ways of integrating human rights.
As I mentioned before, with RTAs, there is a higher probability of
easier consensus, there are more similarities between the countries and, there are more opportunities for more tailored human
rights standards. In addition, there is definitely a higher possibility of a means for enforcement. However, there are some issues
that we do need to pay attention to now that so many RTAs are
being negotiated - like for example inconsistencies with rules and
procedures between several RTAs that one country has signed on
to, and other similar issues that the 'spaghetti bowl' of RTAs is
creating.

